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El presente documento analiza la evolución del sector cafetero colombiano en la última 
década, periodo en el cual ha perdido valor. Se  hace un diagnóstico de las causas que 
han generado el retroceso del sector y propone unas estrategias de política para que 
vuelva a ser competitivo en los mercados internacionales. De las conclusiones se 
destaca la necesidad de mejorar la eficiencia en la producción para poder competir a 
precios cada día mas bajos en el mercado mundial, se propone una estrategia para 
desarrollar negocios en los nichos de los llamados cafés especiales a los que se les 
reconocen primas superiores por parte de los compradores, y en el plano regulatorio se 
recomienda que la parafiscalidad que afecta al sector sea reformulada para que el 
impuesto que tributan los cafeteros sea bajo, estable y fijo en el tiempo. Con los 
recursos que se generen por esta contribución se deberán financiar los programas 
prioritarios para beneficio de los caficultores. Programas que de manera individual no 
pueden ser acometidos (Investigación o promoción). El rol de la institucionalidad 
cafetera deberá ser reformulado. Los recursos del café no deben seguir suplantando 
los recursos del Estado en obras públicas en las regiones cafeteras, pero la 
organización cafetera regional puede convertirse en un ejecutor importante de 
proyectos de inversión con recursos del presupuesto general de la Nación. 
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Executive Summary  
 
Colombia is the world's third-largest producer of coffee and by far the largest single 
producer of washed arabica coffee. Since serious commercial production began there in 
the 1870s it has slowly developed a sterling reputation for consistency and good 
business practices.  Coffee has long been identified with Colombia.  Indeed, coffee has 
for many decades shaped Colombia's fortunes.  Its value at one point reached 80% of 
Colombia's total export value. It was instrumental in fostering much of the country's 
industrial development and many of its important industries today were funded by coffee 
earnings. 
   3
Today coffee plays a much smaller economic role but it's social role has hardly 
diminished.  Coffee has privately funded many of the public development projects in the 
coffee growing regions. It is a primary source of income for nearly a half-million rural 
families.  It is also a source of pride and independence.  Its non-perishability and cash 
value make it the most important crop in the highland areas. In some of these regions 
with proximity to areas of illicit crop harvesting, the labor force that is normally well-
employed in coffee production has been attracted to this illicit alternative now that coffee 
prices and farm employment are at the lowest levels in many decades. In 2001 the real 
value of the coffee harvest was only 40% of its average throughout the 1990s. 
Coffee’s importance, especially among the rural population, has made the current price 
crisis particularly difficult for some of the poorer segments of Colombian society.  There 
is urgent concern that a prolonged crisis could seriously destabilize a number of rural 
areas.  
 
In many rural areas, even for the potential producers of higher-value sustainable or 
differentiated coffees
2, only 40% have ready access to proper post-harvest processing 
facilities. Colombia has pioneered a number of useful processes and methodologies 
including some that are very environmentally friendly. It has been difficult, and more so 
during these times of crisis, to help provide this infrastructure or even disseminate this 
information. Colombia’s productivity has improved nearly 100% over the last 30 years 
but remained fairly constant, on average, during much of the last decade. The late 
1990s showed a worrying decline in this productivity that has been turned around in the 
first two years of this decade. 
Colombia has a sophisticated internal marketing system that operates through several 
distinct channels and affords a grower considerable opportunities to complete a 
satisfactory transaction.  In many cases, though not always, he is not at the mercy of 
one buyer.  
 
The evidence clearly indicates that marketing costs, as well as margins, vary 
significantly from region to region and the farmer’s price appears to depend somewhat 
on the presence of coops in his particular market to provide a competitive price.  
 
The NFCG holds, as a primary responsibility the transference of a fair market price to 
coffee growers and guaranteeing the purchase of all coffees offered so long as they 
comply with the pre-determined quality standards.  A common market practice by other 
purchasing agents and exporters is to use the NFCG public price, which is announced 
daily, as a benchmark for calculating their own prices. Therefore, under liberal market 
conditions, this mechanism helps coffee growers negotiate a transparent price. 
 
Farmers typically receive around 70-75% of the FOB price, when selling their coffee 
through the coop system. This percentage may very significantly depending on the 
exporter and whether intermediaries are used. This is one of the higher rates in the 
world.  
 
                                                 
2 Sustainable coffees include organic, fair trade, eco- friendly.  Differentiated coffees encapsulated in these as well as 
specialty, gourmet, and appellation (Geographic Indications of Origin).  See Annex II for complete description.   4
The market has constantly paid a significant premium for the quality and consistency of 
Colombia's coffee.  Export cargos are fully sight and taste sampled thereby completing 
a series of quality checks that occur throughout the supply chain. The  national 
government has delegated to the NFCG the determination of standards and 
consequently it has the power to stop any shipment. 
 
For the intermediaries, cooperatives, processors, and exporters who take title to this 
coffee, their situation has changed somewhat since the National Coffee Fund (FNC) 
stopped its price stabilization in 2001 and the NFCG had to alter the nature of its 
presence in the marketplace in response to a significant reduction in its operating funds. 
As a result volatility in the internal market has increased to the same level as world 
markets. This has increased the risk and concomitantly the need for risk management 
instruments. The sector is well aware of the risks of its trade and of the instruments 
available to mitigate it. Only s mall and medium farmers are left without meaningful 
access to risk management instruments although in 1999 the NFCG launched a Risk 
Management Department that could eventually help to provide such services to the 
entire farming community.  One useful model for this is the International Task Force on 
Price Risk Management headquartered in the World Bank. 
 
Increasing internal consumption, as Brazil did to become the world's No. 2 consumer, is 
one of the options that can contribute to reducing the long-term impact of the coffee 
crisis. Unfortunately Colombia's internal consumption has been declining. A number of 
factors have contributed to this. Reduced consumer purchasing power that averaged 
22% during the last decade and changing breakfast habits are at the t op of the list. 
Another problem may have been the 19 years of subsidies for internal production that 
induced a strong negative response in terms of both price and consumption when they 
were summarily withdrawn.  Given the downturn in other beverages as well, it may take 
more than promotional campaigns to foster consumption growth. 
 
Colombia's coffee growers have invested a half billion dollars on their promotional 
strategy over the last 40 years. Their brand development and unified marketing are a 
positive  byproduct of a unified coffee industry and set them apart from all other 
producing countries. Not only has this exposure improved the country's overall image 
but its trademarks and brands are also internationally recognized as assets worth 
hundreds of millions of dollars.   
 
Most analysts agree that these marketing approaches pioneered by the NFCG have 
been unparalleled in the coffee world. However, there is concern that it may have 
somewhat lost touch with the market's direction in recent years and failed to generate 
strategic commercialization initiatives to address the current crisis. With only two 
exceptions, it has not created opportunities for its brand to capture more existing value 
in downstream activities especially after its heavy investment in its consumer branding.  
 
While Colombian producers have consistently obtained a respectable premium over 
most other mild coffee producers, prices for all producers have declined considerably.  
Conversely, coffee firms in consuming nations have captured increasingly larger 
downstream margins. Increased production driving down prices is certainly a major 
factor but so is the increasing concentration and growing bargaining power of   5
international coffee traders and roasters. At least one study shows that while long-term 
green coffee producer prices have declined the retail price paid by consumers has 
increased considerably. In changing world markets, Colombia must not only address 
competition from other producers but also from other actors along the supply chain.  
Managing its alliances and flexing of its market power will be critical for its future 
competitiveness. 
 
One reason for Colombia's market success in the past was its development of what 
could almost be called a consistently high mono-quality. Its ability t o provide high 
volumes at a steady quality level gave it a unique advantage and a seemingly 
unassailable place in most large commercial roasters’ blends. In recent years however 
other countries, producing not the same but nevertheless adequate-quality coffees at 
lower prices, have taken some of its market share in commercial blends. At the higher 
end of the market those producers who focused more on differentiated offerings like 
Guatemala are currently earning higher premiums and are establishing a first mover 
advantage in some of those markets.  
Colombia has not been standing still, it has moved to improve its presence in 
supermarkets and also invested in differentiated coffees.  However its commitment to 
the latter has been relatively small until recently. These incipient markets for 
differentiated coffees are of course still relatively little but they are developing at a fast-
pace and production for these could soon reach about 15% of Colombia's total. They 
also earn considerably higher premiums, about 14% on average last year. More 
importantly, it appears evident that Colombia's competitive advantage is not to produce 
the lowest cost coffees for commercial blends. Its factors of production lend themselves 
more to high-quality and differentiated offerings.  
A number of these differentiated coffees have considerable benefits or externalities 
quite apart from their market value. They can contribute to promoting more sustainable 
production practices, to empowering farmers and their cooperatives, and to help foster a 
more rational use of natural resources. They can also be a natural way to manage risk 
since they often do not require considerable upfront investments or the expenditure of 
hard earned cash on imported agrochemicals. Because of these factors and the market 
factors differentiated coffees can be one of the important tools in Colombia's market 
strategy requiring that bottlenecks be resolved in its production and post-harvest 
processes. 
 
Throughout the decades when Colombia set the benchmark for quality and pioneered 
new practices throughout the supply chain perhaps its most notable achievement is a 
sectoral institution that has no parallel in the world: The National Federation of Coffee 
Growers (NFCG). For more than 70 years it has helped coordinate national policy, 
improved cultivation practices through its internationally renowned research institute, 
instituted and maintained the most rigorous set of quality controls in the world, and built 
up perhaps the only commonly known national coffee brand as exemplified by Juan 
Valdez and the "100% Colombian " logo.  An even more remarkable achievement is its 
willingness and ability to invest heavily for the public benefit in coffee growing areas.  It 
has built hundreds of clinics and hospitals, thousands of schools, and funded numerous 
road and infrastructure projects.  It's efforts have been instrumental in achieving the   6
superior levels of human development that currently exist in the coffee growing areas.  
Yet all is not perfect.   
 
A recent in-depth evaluation  recognized its many merits and yet also offered some 
comments about the need to restructure and reinvent the coffee institutions (FNC and 
NFCG) into more lean and agile agencies with improved accountability and 
transparency. This will be critical in order  for them to effectively fulfill their three 
essential functions. Their distinct multiple functions as market regulators, a market 
participant, and a market promoter cannot be credibly mixed together as they have 
been without potentially incurring a number  of problems that range from inappropriate 
political influence to some inefficiency. 
The National Coffee Fund (FNC) is Colombia's primary policy instrument and through its 
National Coffee Committee determines policy.  Originally it was created to stabilize the 
flows of coffees in the early quota days (Convenio Interamericano de Cuotas 1940) and 
then evolved to serve as a price stabilization mechanism for more than 20 years. It 
succeeded in significantly reducing the internal price volatility and helping to m anage 
the supply throughout most of its existence.  By the 1990s it experienced a precipitous 
decline and the recent crisis forced it to end its stabilization functions, cut back much of 
its financing, and seek credit support. 
The NFCG executes the policy determined by the National Coffee Committee but due to 
the current inability of either the farmers or the FNC to make substantial contributions, it 
has been forced to slash its expenditures. It has been able to maintain its most basic 
functions that include:  
§ guaranteed purchase of the coffee produced (provided basic quality is 
met) 
§ the provision of critical services such as research an storage facilities 
§ quality control 
§ sales and marketing overseas 
The coffee ‘contribución’ or tax has been practically suspended due to low prices
3 and 
there is some debate about whether it should be reinstated and at what level.  This 
debate is critical since this income has traditionally funded coffee policy. A recent high-
level report took up the debate and noted that on occasion the government through the 
National Coffee committee pursued its own macroeconomic policy goals and political 
priorities rather than the direct benefit of the coffee growers. Through the FNC, coffee 
growers, rather than pocketing the money, appear t o have contributed an estimated 
$535 million to the national government in the last 17 years. No other agricultural sector 
so heavily finances the government to help conduct its policy. 
Most taxation recommendations agree on a maximum level that is considerably lower 
than in previous years thereby intending to transfer a larger portion of the world price 
directly to growers.  Most importantly, there is a growing awareness of the need to 
foster transparency around how the tax is determined and how it is spent.  
                                                 
3 currently assessed at less than one cent US  per pound    7
One of the less visible and yet most important aspects of the work funded by the FNC is 
the world-class research and development institution: CENICAFE.  While this institution 
has made some notable achievements, there is growing opinion that it could accomplish 
even more with its accumulated inventory of basic research and production technology 
that could greatly benefit the coffee sector on the whole, especially smallholders while 
its focus may have been more on the high-tech and larger scale developments.  It too is 
in need of more appropriate evaluation and feedback mechanisms so that it can be 
more responsive to its constituents. 
For many decades the issue of credit has been a priority for producers. Despite the 
overall historic success of coffee, private financial institutions are not disposed to 
extending credit in rural areas and to small producers. This situation is common to rural 
areas in all developing countries. Even some of the specialized institutions set up to 
specifically serve the agrarian sector have been unable to fulfill the demand. Informal 
credits helps to bridge some of the gap but only at usurious rates of interest.  Initiatives 
like the Productive Alliances Project, are providing hopeful indications of alternative 
solutions at least in some areas. With the dramatic downturn in prices many coffee 
producers have had to restructure their credit more than once. 
At present there are two main subsidies that affect coffee production: A) a subsidy for 
the renovation of coffee plantations and B) a price subsidy that guarantees a price 
support for coffee production. There is concern about the targeting of the former since it 
is available to coffee growers despite their size or means. Various experiences with 
price support schemes provide us with the following lessons: a) maintaining higher 
prices in the face of long-term declining markets is almost impossible and b) if support is 
deemed absolutely necessary, the better approach is to support the income and/or the 
diversification of coffee farmers instead of supporting prices.    
A recent report that studied the costs of different types of production on different farm 
sizes and in different regions concluded that low-cost production schemes are the ones 
more likely to remain feasible in Colombia  and that the Southern Region has the 
brightest future in coffee production. Conversely, the Eastern Region, with the highest 
costs in all considered technologies, could therefore be the most likely to diversify out of 
coffee if low prices continue. 
Modern  technologies with higher production yields per area, also incur higher input 
costs, especially labor costs, which at the prevailing price levels are not offset by 
greater volumes of production. Since less productive traditional technologies have lower 
cost structures, especially labor costs, they seem to be better placed to survive under 
present circumstances. The studies only looked at production costs and of course these 
are only one factor in determining profitability.  The generalized assessments are only 
for the purpose of understanding the overall production potential in each region.  
In coffee growing areas of there has been an increasing level of on-farm diversification 
over time that is mainly the result of farmers’ initiatives. This implies a certain disposition 
to diversify. Much of the diversification away from coffee has not included smallholders 
and occurred primarily on larger landholdings suggesting difficulties for smallholders to 
diversify.  Recent studies have noted that favoring extensive, large scale agriculture 
“…continues the disturbing trend of the past fifty years where the use of land and labor 
in Colombia has been driven in highly inefficient directions by a variety of agriculture   8
sector, land and rural financial policies and sector programs…”
4. There has been little 
diversification into cash crops that could help balance the dependence on coffee. 
Although many crops, which are exclusively associated with food security and 
smallholder agriculture, have remained stable.  
 
Diversification is not easy, especially from a traditional and popular non-perishable cash 
crop like coffee. A diversification program for coffee growing areas must start by 
addressing particular farmer objectives defined according to local necessities (i.e. 
income diversification, improved food safety, promote planting of other more profitable 
coffee varieties, or any combination). It must also help farmers to assess specific issues 
related to appropriate technology, risks, necessary skills, financing, information, and 
markets. Non-farm rural enterprise
5 presents another option.  
 
The government has a key role to play in any diversification initiatives.  It can provide 
vital resources like technical assistance, credit, market research, and organizational 
skills. Colombia has had considerable experience with diversification and many lessons 
can be learned from this. One of the studies reviewing these experiences notes that the 
most successful diversification enterprises were those initiated by the farmers 
themselves, as opposed to institutional programs. 
 
Because of its organization and experience Colombia's coffee sector will survive the 
current crisis relying on its unique ability to adapt and to innovate as it has before. A 
vision of a sustainable coffee sector in Colombia will involve an expanded approach to 
quality, increased focus on emerging environmental issues, more attention given to 
smallholders, and adding value by improving processes and capturing more of the 
downstream margins in the supply chain. To do so its institutions will evolve toward 
more agile and more transparent forms. They will know that the answer is not just about 
quality or about specialty markets or about productivity or about better promotional 
campaigns. It is about managing, like a business,  all of its considerable factors of 




Colombia is one of the world's most important producers of coffee. The current crisis 
dramatically affects not only its own situation but also that of the world's coffee markets.  
The World Bank has undertaken this study in response to the government's and its own 
concern, expressed at the highest levels. It intends to examine the current situation 
throughout the sector and its impact at the social as well as the economic and 
environmental levels. This study is complemented by a separate report that assesses 
the larger global situation in terms of the dominant supplying countries and  the 
evolution of demand. 
 
                                                 
4 Drawing from Heath, John and Hans Binswanger. Natural Resource Degradation effects of poverty and population 
growth are largely policy-induced: the case of Colombia.. Environment and Development Economics. World Bank. 
Conveyed in personal communication from M. McMahon. 
5 Many useful services from machine repair to accounting to equipment rental can provide valuable services that 
support farm communities and make them more productive while reducing the inherent risk associated with farming.   9
This introduction outlines the global situation in brief and sets the context with a 
synopsis of Colombia's coffee history and its unique "caficultura” . Chapters 2 and 3 
assess the impact of the current coffee situation in both economic and social terms.  
Chapters 4 and 5 address the current situation and the relevant issues in its production 
and post-harvest processes.  Chapters 6 assesses the marketing chain from the grower 
to the exporter and considers some of the competitive options that are available. It also 
considers Colombia's domestic and international promotions. Chapter 7 takes a look at 
the relevant institutions at the local, regional, and national levels; it describes their roles 
and evolution and discusses issues relevant to their future.  Chapters 8 and 9 review 
the situation of credit and the risk management options that are currently available. The 
policies currently selected by the government to resolve this crisis are considered in 
chapter 10 and compared to the lessons learned in other countries. The  current 
production systems and their regional differences are considered in chapter 11 and 
some conclusions drawn about the profitability of diverse production systems in different 
regions.  Chapter 12 discusses some of the options for the sector to capture more value 
for its products. The last chapter reviews some of the rationale and the required 
parameters for any successful diversification and reflects on the inherent challenges 









Jesuit  priests are credited with having first introduced coffee into Colombia around 
1723. Colombia’s long history as a commercial coffee producer and exporter only began 
in the 1870s. At the end of the nineteenth century, production was primarily 
concentrated in the department of North Santander (in eastern Colombia). At the 
beginning of the twentieth century, its growth spread with the consolidation of 
settlements in Antioquia and coffee became the main crop in these new areas. By 
around 1910 its production and exports topped one million pounds and coffee 
accounted for about half of Colombia's export revenue. Caldas and Antioquia soon 
consolidated their current position as the country's main coffee growing departments. 
Coffee activity now occurs in 604 of the nation's 1,022 municipalities. 
For decades it helped to provide the foreign income that fueled the growth of many 
other productive and industrial sectors. By 1920 Colombia was exporting 2.3 million 
bags valued at US$106 million. By then, coffee was so vital to the economy that it 
represented approximately 65% of Colombia’s total exports. Later in the decade this 
percentage climbed even higher to 80%. Its considerable capacity to generate 
employment was perhaps more valuable than its foreign exchange earnings. This 
employment and subsequent cash flow fueled a new level of purchasing power among 
many segments of the population. This new demand therefore became an essential 
element in the growth of banks, railways, and many firms in the industrial sector. 
One hundred and twenty years later, Colombia has benefited from its coffee history and 
it has diversified and considerably strengthened its economic position. While coffee may 
not be as economically important to Colombia as it was in the past, it is still vital.  Not 
only is it important for Colombia but for the world as well. Colombia’s share of the 
international market went from 10.6 percent during the first half of the 1970s, to 15.2 
percent in the first half of the 1990s, falling to 11 percent during the last two years 
(Clavijo, Jaramillo, and Leibovich, 1994; Pizano, 2001). Colombia is now the world's 
third-largest coffee exporter with 10 million bags in 2001  representing foreign exchange 
earnings of US$ 893 million.  
Colombia's population estimate for 2001 is just over 40 million people.  It's per capita 
GDP purchasing power parity is approximately $6,200 yet more than 50% of its 
population is below the poverty line. Colombia's coffee story is more than economics, it 
is inextricably entwined with its culture, its development, and even its identity. Colombia 
has 805,000 hectares of coffee fields, with farms averaging 1.4 hectares per farmer. 
Yet, Colombia does not have a homogenous coffee sector, it is comprised of 
considerable diversity. It is this very complexity that provides many of the seeds of its 
future competitive success. This very diversity is a valuable asset as it strives to 
revitalize its coffee culture and continues its valuable contributions to nearly three 
million people that depend on coffee. 
 
Coffee Cultivation, Harvesting and Processing in Colombia
6  
 
Colombian coffee is grown in mountainous regions at altitudes ranging from 1,000 to 
2,100 meters, where the average temperature is between 18 and 22 degrees Celsius 
                                                 
6 Partly adapted from ICO Colombia profile   11
and rainfall is frequent.  Given the wide climatic and geographical differences, Colombia 
cannot be said to have a specific coffee harvesting period, as is the case in many other 
coffee-producing countries. Depending on the region, coffee is harvested throughout the 
year, with a principal crop between October and December, and a secondary crop 
between April and May1. There are, however, some regions in  which the principal crop 
is harvested between April and May and the secondary crop between October and 
December, thus allowing a more even flow of fresh coffee. In order to guarantee good 
quality. The secondary crop is popularly known as the "Traviesa" or "Mitaca". A tree can 
be visited up to eight occasions until all the ripe cherries have been picked at their 
optimal stage of development. 
 
In order to produce a final bag of green coffee (60 kg) the grower must harvest and 
process approximately 450 kilos of fresh coffee cherries. After harvesting, the coffee 
undergoes a preparation process which transforms the ripe cherries into parchment 
coffee ready for marketing and industrial preparation. The coffee is prepared by the wet 
processing method.  This means that farms usually have access to preparation facilities 
that usually include the following:  
 
Pulping: this process separates the pulp from the ripe cherries and is done by pulping 
machines on the day the cherries are picked and thus differentiates them from 
“naturals”. 
 
Fermentation: this process removes the remaining mucilaginous pulp covering the 
bean. The coffee beans are placed in fermentation tanks and left to ferment for between 
12 and 24 hours depending on the local temperature. This operation may also be 
carried out using special equipment; when mucilage-removing equipment is used, the 
process is carried out in a single continuous operation. 
 
Washing:  after fermentation, the beans are washed in canals of running water in order 
to remove the fermented mucilage. 
 
Drying:  the coffee is dried in the sun; on very large farms, mechanical driers are used.  
The dried coffee is known as parchment coffee and is often sold in this form. 
 
Once the coffee has been prepared by the grower, he sells his crop, which is then 
milled and marketed. After milling and before final bagging, the coffee is classified by 
color, size and shape; specialized equipment and female workers are employed for this 
purpose. Quality control is then carried out by NFCG whose experts take samples of the 
various types of coffee.  These are roasted, ground and brewed, and coffee tasters 
classify the coffee in accordance with its aroma, body (concentration), acidity and 
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Global Context and Trends 
 
The coffee industry is undergoing some fundamental changes in the nature of the 
business, and it is important to recognize the extent and consequences of the emerging 
paradigm shift.
7  These include: 
 
•  Dramatic increases in tree plantings that now practically ensure structural long-
term overproduction potential, particularly in unwashed arabicas and robusta. 
•  The quality of these less-expensive coffees is steadily improving. 
•  The ability and willingness to substitute traditional coffee origins in most industrial 
blends. 
•  Increased concentration, especially among roasters and traders, which reduces 
market options. 
•  Market concentration, inadequate information, and speculation will likely fuel 
continued high volatility in the absence of an international agreement. 
•  Lower green beans prices no longer necessarily correlate with lower roaster and 
retail prices that would usually stimulate increased consumption. 
 
Support and Stabilization Schemes 
 
In the past there have been several international attempts to stabilize world coffee 
prices through the International Coffee Agreement (ICA).  The ICA succeeded in 
keeping coffee prices higher and stable, although price stabilization benefited mostly 
exporting countries with established higher quotas, and penalized new entrants 
(Akiyama and Varangis 1990).  Since 1989, the ICA has not included economic clauses 
that would regulate the coffee market, resulting in greater world price volatility and 
overall lower prices during the 1990s.  From 1993 until its recent demise, a producers’ 
organization, the Association of Coffee Producing Countries, tried but failed to regulate 
the world coffee supply through a retention scheme. 
 
In addition to international efforts, several coffee-producing countries (including 
Cameroon, Colombia, Cote d’Ivoire, and Papua New Guinea) have used price 
stabilization funds.  Almost all of these stabilization funds ran into serious financial 
difficulties. In most cases, the funds eventually went bankrupt.  While it lasted, 
Columbia’s was certainly the most successful, but its net worth has dramatically 
decreased and it can no longer perform its stabilization function. 
 
During the 1990s, several coffee-producing countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala) tried to support domestic prices.
8  Mexico and Nicaragua used funds 
                                                 
7 A considerably more in-depth treatment of this topic occurs in the companion document, “Global Supply and 
Demand: New Paradigms in the Coffee Market.” 
 
8 Costa Rica’s National Fund for Coffee Stabilization (FONECAFE) paid farmers $6.38 per quintal during 1998–99 
and 1999–2000, and $18.76 per quintal during 2000–01, with the obligation of a repayment by farmers if world prices   13
differently to support the income of small coffee producers by giving a fixed payment per 
hectare with caps on maximum farm size rather than production quantity.  More 
recently, Guatemala is using a fund to promote diversification, agroprocessing, 
marketing, and debt restructuring.  The various experiences with price support schemes 
and stabilization funds provide us with the following lessons: 
 
•  Most price stabilization schemes aim to support domestic prices when world 
prices decline.  The objective of higher prices rather than stable prices is almost 
impossible to maintain (Wright and Williams 1990; Deaton 1992; McIntire and 
Varangis 1999). 
•  If support is deemed absolutely necessary, the better approach is to support 
the income and/or the diversification of coffee farmers instead of supporting 
prices.  Mexico and Nicaragua, for example, have provided a support linked to 
amount of hectares under coffee so that there is less distortionary incentive to 
increase production in order to receive more. 
•  Any price support scheme that maintains a higher price level removes the 
realistic incentives for necessary adjustments in terms of  diversification and 
reducing production in marginal areas. 
 
Global Production and Demand Trends 
 
In the last 20 years, world production has increased from 86 million bags to about 122 
million bags today (USDA 2002), giving rise to surpluses on the order of 10 million bags 
in 2002, and more in 2003.  For the near to mid-term, most predict that price recovery 
will be slow. Production may drop below demand by 2003/04, but significant 
accumulated stocks will remain a negative influence on prices. 
 
When looking  for an answer to coffee’s dismal prices, most fingers point first to 
Vietnam, whose dramatic 1,400 percent robusta production increase in a decade 
(1990–2000) appears to have surprised the industry.  While Vietnam’s meteoric rise to 
number 2 producer, with 14.7 million bags in the 2000/2001 year, makes it the most 
visible contributor to overproduction, it is by no means the only one (see Figure 1).  
Brazil, for example, has added more to the global supply over the last five years than 
Vietnam has (Giovannucci 2002), and its production increase in this year alone (about 
13 million bags) exceeds Vietnam’s total output for this year.  Also of note is that since 
the 1997 low point for consumer stocks, the stocks of arabicas (particularly Other Milds) 
have been g rowing faster than robustas.  Consumer stocks of Colombian coffee fell 
sharply in 1995 to about one month’s supply, where they have remained since.  This, 
along with reduced Colombian stocks, may have contributed to raised differentials in 
relation to the  Other Milds, as can be seen in Figure A1. However, recently that 
premium has been lost as the prices of other good-quality washed arabicas have risen 
as production of washed arabicas has fallen. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
increase above $92 per quintal.  Similar efforts by El Salvador and Guatemala were all funded through the issuance 
of bonds.   14
Figure A1. Differentials—Colombia and Other Milds 
 
Source: Lewin, World Bank 
 
Brazil produced a bumper crop in 1998/99 of about 38 million bags from about 3.4 
billion trees.  Recent estimates suggest there are approximately 4.6 billion trees now in 
production, with about 1.3 billion more still developing.  Of these 6 billion trees, many 
new ones went into northern frost-free zones and the highly productive areas of the 
Cerrado (Giovannucci 2002). Brazilian cooperatives in Sol do Minas are now 
introducing washed coffees, and perceive a production capability of about 2 million 
bags. The quality of the unwashed and semiwashed coffees has improved, and is now 
able to take a much larger part of commercial blends than before, displacing other 
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Figure A2.   
Source: World Bank ITF 
 
Until the arrival of the 2002/03 Brazil crop, the most notable increase has been in 
robustas, where Brazil, India, and Vietnam, particularly, have seen substantial 
increases. Exportable robusta production now accounts for over 40 percent of import 
demand, which historically has not been much more than 33 percent. 
 
This increased capacity has strong implications for future supply.  Historians would note 
that this boom–bust cycle has plagued the industry f or more than a century, including 
Colombia’s own, although more modest, 50-percent-plus production increases in the 
1970s. Indeed, it is not just coffee that suffers this cycle; it is almost an a priori definition 
of commodities.  The availability of these coffees and flexible usage patterns have come 
following a period in which high volatility and high prices forced coffee roasters in 
importing countries to make a number of changes in their business, and this is another 
key part of the paradigm shift. 
 
Through the use of new technologies, industry has been able to lower its necessary 
working stock levels and has also been able to introduce more flexibility into its 
blending—by, for example, steaming robustas and some low-grade arabicas to reduce 
their harsh taste. Analysis of imports from Colombia and other washed arabica 
producers into countries such as Germany suggests that roasters are finding 
replacements for the average quality output from Colombia.  It is not clear whether they 
 
Importer Demand for Exportable Production 
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would switch back if Colombian output rebounded above recent levels.  This implies that 
Colombia must be savvy about its strategies in these markets. 
 
Conceptually, the overall market can be perceived as a quality pyramid with inexpensive 
soluble coffee at the bottom, standard commercial blends in the middle, and 
progressing toward high-end differentiated coffee at the top.  While the top and bottom 
are growing at a healthy pace, the vast middle section has been stagnant.  Colombia’s 
general position is primarily in this middle tier, and therefore finding sustainable future 




The fact that technology has led roasters to become more flexible in their approach to 
blending has increased the requirements of agile just-in-time logistical capabilities of 
suppliers, which has consequently favored the largest trading companies, leading to 
concentration of the supply chain in fewer major traders.  The shortening of the trade 
chain and the loss of some market players has also led to a concentration of the 
marketing margins in the hands of the more powerful players.  Today, retailers, with 
their ability to manage consumer information and prices, are in the driver’s seat.  Their 
ability to develop private labels and otherwise bypass the traditional trading channels is 
fast emerging as a critical issue.  Only the more organized producer groups will have 
the capacity to deal with them directly. 
 
Globally, the food industry is consolidating at every level.  While this trend increases 
efficiency, it also reduces the leverage of producers and makes it increasingly difficult 
for smallholders and small and medium-size enterprises to participate in the markets.  
As the dominant players 
downstream in the supply chain 
capture more value and enforce 
exclusivity on their suppliers in 
order to maximize profits, increase 
entry barriers, and mitigate risk (that 
is, food safety, market risk, 
financial), they are fast emerging as 
the dominant form of competition.  
To be competitive today, producers 
need to address supply-chain 
development at every level so that they add value to agricultural products as they 
require individual participants to coordinate their activities in a continuous improvement 
process. 
 
A declining share of earnings is further aggravating the dire situation of Colombia and 
other producer countries.  In the 1980s consumers spent approximately $30 billion per 
year on coffee, and producing countries earned approximately $9 billion, or nearly 30 
percent of this.  Today consumers spend an average of $55 billion a year on coffee, and 
producing countries earn approximately $6 billion, or 11 percent of this (Gemeil 2001). 
Table 1A. The Increasing Concentration of 
the International Coffee Business 
 
•  5 traders dominate 48% 
•  5 importers manage 46% 
•  5 roasters control 55% 
 
 
Source: Pizano, 2001 
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Macro Trends in Established Consumer Markets 
If, indeed, consolidation is now a dominant competitive paradigm, other options are fast 
emerging for smaller producers and enterprises to exploit channels that large supply 
chains and mega-enterprises find less cost-effective than mass production.  One such 
channel is differentiation, where producers can develop a competitive advantage that is 
not easily affected by generic competitive factors (price, distribution, and so forth) that 
dominant actors often command. 
 
Quality and value will continue their emergence as competitive standards with 
continued, although more modest, prosperity in the European Union (EU) and in the 
United States, where postwar baby boomers will drive growing demand for “highly 
targeted and specialized products” ( Food Distribution Magazine 2001),  and mass 
market brands are particularly vulnerable to intense competition.  This is supported by 
industry research pointing out that individualized tastes of the percentage of the U.S. 
population consuming gourmet coffee
9 has grown considerably in recent years, from 31 
percent to 46 percent. 
 
According to the U.S. National Coffee Association, coffee-drinking habits are elastic 
among consumers under age 35.  After age 35, the proportion of people who convert 
from non-coffee drinkers to regular coffee drinkers is low, suggesting that in relatively 
mature markets like the United States, the coffee industry will have to capture more 
young people as they enter adulthood. 
 
Another area of strong growth is the market for soluble coffee.  This is growing at the 
high end for more mature markets and among the most basic quality levels in the 
emerging markets. Some of the high-end markets such as the United Kingdom use a 
considerable proportion of arabica beans in their soluble offerings. 
 
Increasing food safety concerns (mycotoxins, bovine spongiform encephalopathy [BSE, 
or “mad cow” disease], hoof and mouth disease, genetically modified organisms) 
stimulate strong market responses. This implies a fundamental shift in the role of grades 
and standards from reducing transaction costs to serving as strategic tools for market 
penetration, system  coordination, quality and safety assurance, and product niche 
definition.  These are being driven by three sets of changes in the global trade regime: 
 
1.  A new  regulatory environment, with the World Trade Organization and its 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary/Technical Barriers to Trade agreements, regional 
trade agreements, and even governmental requirements (EU standards for 
ochratoxin, maximum residue levels, and so forth) make entry into fast-
globalizing markets more demanding than ever for products across the 
agricultural spectrum. 
 
                                                 
9 Defined as “premium whole bean or ground varieties” in the 2001 “National Coffee Drinking Trends Study,” The 
National Coffee Association, New York. 
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2.  A new business environment features increased legal liability and requires “due 
diligence,” such as the international standards organization and hazards analysis 
at critical control points,  that are some of the institutional methods  of 
standardizing.  Supply chain concentration also demands ever-increasing levels 
of standards and performance measured by global rather than local performance 
standards.  Individual firms and chains (supermarket, fast food, and so forth) are 
increasingly creating their own standards that they impose on the agrifood chains 
that they dominate in developing countries (the Ethical Trade Initiative and Euro 
Retailer Produce Working Group). 
 
3.  There is a new  consumer environment that features increased food safety 
concerns, a focus on health and diet, and increasingly globalized consumer 
tastes. In more developed markets, experts predict that social and environmental 
concerns, especially ethical ones will continue to emerge as not only competitive 
differentiators but as basic rules of the game and prerequisites for participation. 
 
Coffee sales are affected by these concerns even if coffee is not directly affected.  
There is great interest in the economic, social, and environmental benefits of 
differentiated and specialty coffees and their volumes have grown dramatically in recent 
years.  The markets for these products should be approached with caution since they 
are still limited and can involve considerable farmer effort to adapt to their more 
stringent requirements.  However, their development often provides additional benefits 
or externalities beyond competitive advantage; that is, improved natural resource 





Some leading buyers are either implementing or considering sustainable sourcing 
guidelines that differentiate them from other sources of supply, and may push the 
demand for coffees like organics that fit these criteria.  The differentiated markets, led 
by continued strong growth in the United States that is now spilling over into Europe and 
parts of Asia, offer excellent circumscribed opportunities for higher-quality producers, 
although volumes in most of these markets are still very modest. 
 
The differentiated markets could be one valuable tool with which to earn higher 
revenues and a superior market reputation.  In the case of Colombia, these can serve 
as valuable levers to help it benefit from its quality-oriented competitive advantage.  
These markets can and often do overlap each other.  They include: 
•  Geographic Indications of Origin 
•  Gourmet and specialty 
•  Organic 
•  Fair trade 
•  Ecofriendly or shade grown. 
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Coffee’s share in total GDP 
       
Chart 3 
A discussion of their primary characteristics and their current trends is presented in 
Annex II. The reasons for their importance as part of a strategy include:  a) Consistent 
high growth rates; b) Price premiums; c) They can address global social and 
environmental concerns; d) The need to access market niches that are competitively 
different; and e) The opportunity to provide positive externalities in the field. 
 
2.  Coffee’s Economic Impact 
 
For decades, coffee was the single most important sector of the Colombian economy.  
Through the mid 1980s, coffee policy was synonymous with macroeconomic policy.  
Since then, coffee’s relative macroeconomic importance began to decline. This 
tendency was the result of a deliberate diversification policy of sources of income and 












Thanks to its diversification the coffee sector crisis has not produced a serious balance 
of payments problem and neither has it become a generalized crisis of the whole 
economy. In effect, as it is shown in Charts 2 and 3 participation of the coffee sector has 
decreased from around 30% of agricultural GDP in the middle of the 1970s, to less than 
24% at the end of the decade, and from nearly 3% of total GDP to less than 2% 
duringthat same period. 
 
   Chart 1   
Major Sectors’ Share of Total Exports   
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While it is evident that the behavior of world coffee prices is volatile, and that during the 
twentieth century coffee prices reached extraordinarily high peaks (1954 and 1977), in 
real terms its long term trend has been a decreasing one. In effect the price of mild 
coffees is the lowest in history. Producers who can deal profitably with situations such 
as these are those who can offset low prices with greater productivity, lower costs of 
production or product differentiation strategies, in order to sell their output at greater 















































































































Us$ct /pound in constant terms
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3.  Social Impacts of Coffee 
 
Coffee today does not only derive its importance from being one of Colombia’s main 
exports, but also because fully 18% of Colombia’s rural households depend on it directly 
for their income. According to  the Encuesta Nacional Cafetera in 1997, Colombia’s 
coffee zone had 566,230 coffee farms with a total of 423,368 households living on them. 
 
The coffee sector has made considerable public investments in its growing regions. It 
has in many cases made an impact superior to even that of the national government. 
Levels of illiteracy are notably lower than the national average.  On average, 80% of 
households have local primary schools. With government support The NFCG has 
constructed more than 6000 schools that can teach approximately 360,000 children.  
 
In coffee growing regions there is greater availability of a clean drinking water, utilities 
and basic sanitation. Even health services are better and have greater coverage than in 
non-coffee producing areas. The NFCG, investing resources provided by the coffee tax 
built 180 hospitals and over 200 health clinics in the coffee growing regions. 
Unfortunately many of these advances are unlikely to be continued given the difficult 
financial condition of the NFCG 
 
It is of little consolation to know that the impacts of today’s historic price lows are not 
confined to the coffee regions. Many commodities like coffee have experienced 
dramatic lows in recent years and coffee price volatility has quadrupled in the last 
decade (less so domestically due to price supports). Low prices and volatility impact the 
poorest segments of society most of all. In Colombia, the inability or failure to diversify 
and/or add value has left commodity production as the primary source of income f or 
many thousands of poor families. l 
 
A coffee farmer audit finished in 2001 (Common Fund for Commodities et al., 2001) 
noted in order of importance the main problems mentioned by small coffee farmers: 
 
1.  low coffee prices 
2.  lack of rural credit 
3.  commercialization problems 
4.  lack of community organization 
5.  low coffee productivity 
 
The inability to reinvest in their farms or their productivity leads to many well-
documented problems including: rural migration, reduced education and healthcare, and 
even unsustainable natural resource use with corresponding environmental problems. 
How best to manage the negative consequences of fewer coffee commodity market 
options and volatile coffee markets are key issues for Colombian farmers and the allied 
coffee industry. This need is particularly pointed in light of emerging information that 
global shifts in production and consumption patterns indicate that the depression of 
prices could be considerably longer than in the past.    22
 
As profitability in coffee production decreases, field cultivation practices which demand 
labor and fertilizers decrease as well, affecting not only physical coffee quality but also 
its organoleptic quality.  This decrease in quality is manifesting itself already and in the 
future its effect will only compound given the cyclical and slow developing nature of 
coffee trees. Consequently, these current responses in the field to low prices will affect 
coffee quality several years into the future and continue to jeopardize farm incomes 
even when the crisis passes. 
 
The volatility of domestic producer prices, 
in turn, has increased significantly, as 
measured by volatility index, which rose 
from 10% in 1995, to 32% in 2000, 
approaching the world price volatility 
index. See Table 1. In 2001 the 
abandonment of stabilization policy 
floated the producer p rice to fully reflect 
world market prices. 
 
The coffee production area has reduced 
17% or ca. 170,000 Ha. In the last 
decade according to FAO data. According to the Encuesta Nacional Cafetera (1997)
10, 
since 1970 there has been an increase in the number of coffee farms from 297,000 to 
668,000, and a reduction in the coffee growing areas from 1.05 million to 870,000 
hectares in 1997. This indicates a reduction in the average size of farms whose primary 
crop is coffee from 14.8 to 5 hectares and in the average size of actual coffee plots from 
3.5 to 1.4 hectares
11.  
 
Distribution of Coffee Plots by size 








(60 kg. Bags) 
% 
       0 – 1  364.300  167.000  1.811.880  15,10% 
       >1 – 5  172.200  373.000  4.857.552  40,48% 
 > 5 -10  20.100  138.000  2.011.632  16,76% 
   >10 – 20  6.900  93.500  1.561.140  13,01% 
       > 20  2.800  98.000  1.757.700  14,65% 
         
Total  566.300  869.500  11.999.904  100% 
Table 2.  Source: Encuesta Nacional Cafetera 1997 
 
 
                                                 
10 this is the most current set of this data on the sector. 
11 The current Agricultural Production Unit (APU) definition differs from the one used in 1970 of the farm; the 
argument does not refer to APUs but to farms alone. 
Coffee Prices Volatility Index 
(Standard Deviation %) 
Year  World Price  Producer Price 
1995  35.52  9.69 
1996  39.75  19.76 
1997  65.12  40.13 
1998  36.56  25.40 
1999  55.52  26.83 
2000  47.86  32.07 
Table 1.  Source: NCFG   23
There is no clear evidence yet that the coffee crisis has induced a widescale process of 
illicit crop substitution in the coffee regions although several news stories and the 
National Federation of Coffee Growers (NFCG) reports indicate that it is happening 
sporadically and the possibility is ominous
12. But there are indications that the shortage 
of employment opportunities and rural diversification options combine with the insecurity 
in many areas to form a self-feeding circle that serves to limit productive long-term 
investment and results in greater dependence on illicit crops and low-labor activities like 
livestock. Cocaine has helped produce a ‘Dutch disease’ effect, contributing to the 
appreciation of the peso and to higher real wages in the countryside.  
 
In some of the coffee departments such as Huila, Tolima, Cauca and Nariño, with 
proximity to areas of illicit crop harvesting, this has created a source of attraction for the 
labor force employed in coffee production. Hence, illicit crops  have pushed up labor 
scarcity and costs. To date, the main effect of illicit crops is not coffee crop substitution 
but a distortion of the labor markets. In the case of the smaller producer, whose source 
of labor is his own family, and whose family income is generated not only by agricultural 
produce but also by wages earned outside the farm, he is likely to benefit from this 
phenomenon. For the larger coffee producer, highly dependent on wage labor this 
situation will increase his costs of production. Given the few cash crop alternatives in 
remote rural areas, coffee is one of the few viable legal options for income but cannot 
compete with higher value illicit crops.  
 
Today, 18% of Colombia’s rural households depend directly on coffee production for 
income, be it through coffee harvesting or through wage labor. Many of these 
employment opportunities come from the larger coffee producers. Labor employed in 
the coffee sector during the last decade has represented on average about 34% of total 
agricultural employment
13.  While at the beginning of the 1990s coffee was responsible 
for about 750 thousand full jobs in coffee growing areas (Junguito & Pizano,1991), in 
2000 coffee was responsible for 515 thousand full time jobs (Office of Advisors in 
Coffee Matters, 2000).  The NCFG estimates that approximately 100,000 more people 
may lose jobs in the sector
14. 
 
Even if a few small producers have been able to partially compensate their lower 
income with some illicit resources, the overall effect of lower international prices on the 
sector’s income has been dramatic. As measured by the real value of the coffee crop, 
the coffee sector’s income has fallen 50% during the last decade. In 2001 alone income 
was fully 40% less than the decade average. As a result, coffee producers´ welfare has 
been severely affected, and there has been a high human cost.  Due to the reduced 
profitability of the coffee sector, it is estimated that the number of households in coffee 
growing areas living under the poverty line rose from 54.2% to 61% between 1997 and 




                                                 
12 For example, El Tiempo Feb 17, 2002 and  Dec 5, 2001 had a front-page bulletin about the crisis in coffee zone 
and accompanying ills of drugs, kidnapping--both precipitors and consequences of a bad situation. 
13 excluding animal husbandry 
14 Personal communication Diego Pizano (March 5, 2002 email commentary)   24
Chart 4A.     Real Value of Harvest (in billions of pesos constant at year 2000 value) 
Source: NFCG from CAIC report 
 
4.  Production Issues  
 
For many decades Colombia's production policy emphasized relatively high volumes of 
production (the world's No. 2 producer until recently) and above-average quality levels. 
Planted areas increased almost 40% during the 1960s reaching an all time peak of 
almost 1.1 million hectares in 1970 as measured by that year’s coffee census. From 
there onwards there has been a steady decline in planted areas, so that the area 
estimated by the NFCG for 2002 is 805,000 hectares.  
 
Colombia’s coffee production has reduced slightly in recent years although it has 
remained more or less constant for the last 30 years while Brazil and Vietnam; the two 
other major world producers have increased their production (See Chart 5).   
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The modernization program of coffee areas launched by the NFCG and the favorable 
conditions of the world coffee markets help to push physical productivity from an 
average of 7 bags per hectare a year in 1970 to 12.9 in 1982. However, from the early 
1980s it has remained more or less constant in values averaging between 12 and 14 
coffee bags per hectare with some notable rises and falls including a brief peak of more 
than 18 bags per hectare in 1993.  In the 1990s productivity quickly fell from the 1993 
high back to below 13 bags per hectare by the late 1990s. While this may indicate that 
Colombia’s coffee sector is near to its limit in terms of increases in physical productivity, 
the NFCG estimates that productivity, in the mid to long-term, has a potential of 
reaching 20 bags per hectare. The NFCG renovation program has b een largely 
responsible for recent increases in these averages since the year 2000. In 2002 
productivity levels reached 13.7 bags per hectare and 2003 projections are for 14 bags 
with modest and steady increases over the next few years due primarily to the amount 
of new trees coming into full production. 
 
Although the great 1970's effort of modernization significantly improved coffee 
production and productivity, the overall structure of coffee production has otherwise 
remained mostly unchanged except for a  clear reduction in planted areas. Labor 
productivity, for example has improved only marginally in the last 30 years. While 
productivity is certainly important from an economic standpoint, other production factors 
such as differentiation/specialization or high-quality orientation may be equally valid and 
worthy of consideration. Colombian coffee growers face a complex scenario nationally 
and internationally, which nonetheless offers them several profitable alternatives. Some 
growers will need to depart somewhat from the commodity production mentality and 
start evaluating, with the available institutional support, the alternatives open to them 
according to their particular interests and possibilities. However, to aid them in taking 
Coffee Production 
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appropriate decisions, certain institutional aspects of production need to be addressed 
and made available to the coffee producing sector.  
 
Planting materials 
Disease resistant and more productive coffee varieties are necessary to ensure the 
long-term competitiveness of Colombia’s f armers. Cenicafé should be encouraged to 
continue research on commercial varieties that are capable of reducing cultivation labor 
and protecting the environment from unnecessary use of agrochemicals. The NFCG 
has a program designed to renovate 70,000 hectares a year with young trees. 
Approximately 35% of these hectares under renovation are planted with new trees 
resistant to coffee leaf rust: ‘Variedad Colombia’. However, questions have been raised 
about the quality control system to ensure their resistant advantages and these must be 




For many years the NFCG subsidized the use of fertilizers, perhaps unsustainably since 
the real beneficiaries in some cases may have been crops other than coffee. A 
promising soil conservation program that appeared effective and had long-term 
sustainability was unfortunately stopped because of the FNC’s financial crisis. 
 
Integrated soil conservation can significantly reduce the need f or all externally 
purchased inputs and therefore reduce farmers’ exposure to financial risk incurred when 
borrowing or spending cash for synthetic agrochemicals. Coffee soil in Colombia, with 
its high volcanic ash content, is very fragile and easily erodible. A comprehensive soil 
conservation program should include policies aimed at reducing trees’ age, stimulating 
use of shade trees and wind barriers (where appropriate), introducing leguminous soil 
coverings, planting of associated crops, and avoiding the  indiscriminate use of 
insecticides and fungicides. To preserve and increase the soil’s natural microorganisms, 
some synthetic fertilizers should be substituted with organic material such as compost, 
coffee pulp, and other green fertilizers.  These simple o rganically-oriented methods, 




Since the 1970s Colombia implemented an active coffee production policy whose main 
objective was to increase  physical productivity in coffee plantations; this was to be 
brought about primarily by promoting highly productive coffee varieties with 
corresponding agrochemical inputs and increasing plantation densities. This proved to 
be a rather successful policy while the economic clauses (quotas) of the International 
Coffee Agreement lasted and Colombia’s rural labor market had an oversupply of 
workers on offer. However, these and other variables have changed to warrant a new 
consideration of this strategy.  
 
Colombia’s cost of rural labor has increased over time, in part due to the ongoing 
conflict in rural areas causing a shortage of labor supply. This of course affects coffee’s   27
costs of production, especially those of the highly productive farms which are intensive 
in wage labor. Labor costs amount to between 70% and 80% of final production costs. 
The rise in labor costs has not been offset by a corresponding increase in labor 
productivity; hence coffee’s higher physical productivities may be producing an adverse 
effect in its cost structure especially under the present scenario of relatively low world 
coffee prices. 
 
Decades of promoting higher physical productivities may also have helped to produce 
environmental stress, in terms of deforestation, water contamination, loss of the soil 
fertility and reduction of biodiversity. These negative externalities today may be 
obstacles for the development of certain differentiated and specialty coffee such as 
organic, and therefore a consistent policy to develop more environmentally-friendly 
types of coffee will be needed to address them. 
 
As shown in Chart 6 Colombia’s coffee production exhibited a constant annual 
production of around 8.7 million coffee bags up until the mid 70s, when it started 
increasing, most certainly as an effect of the process of modernization, until it reached 
an average annual level of 11.5 million coffee bags for the remaining part of the century. 
The observed peak in 1992 of 18 million coffee bags was due to a combination of 
favorable conditions which have not repeated themselves since then. The average 
annual production over the last five years has been approximately 10.8 million bags in 


























































































In 1998 the NFCG launched a renovation program targeted to lower the overall average 
age of planted trees to between 5 and 
5.5 years of age. This was to be brought 
about by subsidizing the yearly 
renovation of approximately 70,000 
hectares, starting in 1998. Coffee plots 
under renovation have no meaningful 
production in the first two years, begin 
producing on the third and reach a peak 
on the fifth. The following data in Table 
3 reflects the renovation program’s 
results. 
 
One of the critical variables limiting 
increases in physical productivity is the 
cost of labor because of the fact that 
increases in productivity demand similar increases in labor that therefore offset income 
gains due to greater production. Small coffee growers (plots under 5 hectares) disguise 
this fact by employing family labor. As will be discussed more extensively in section 11 
(Viable Coffee Production Systems in a Low Price Scenario), employment of non-wage 
labor by these farmers results in that their actual production costs are under 0.45 
US$/pound
15. Medium and large producers (coffee plots bigger than 5 hectares) have 
production costs of over US$0.53/pound
16 and the difference in costs are primarily 
explained by the fact that 95% of their labor needs medium and large producers are met 
by wage labor.  
 
The NFCG’s own assessments indicate that there is room to increase the output per ha. 
about 100% in some areas and that a 20% further reduction in average costs of 
production is possible. Increasing output productivity is certainly welcome but the 
methods must be well considered given the potential negative environmental 
externalities of intensified production and that an increase in physical productivity is not 
necessarily followed by an increase in profitability. 
 
With world prices for Colombian coffee at below 0.70 US$/pound, profitability in coffee 
production for medium and big producers is too low to be attractive for investment.  
Therefore any proposed intensification of production can have the following 
shortcomings which have to be addressed in order to design a consistent and realistic 
production policy: 
 
§ Produces an increase on demand for manual labor thereby potentially narrowing 
profitability even further for the medium and large coffee producers. 
§ Care for coffee quality  –one of Colombia’s comparative advantage– requires a 
careful process of selection before and during harvesting which depends on 
manual labor and adequate infrastructure, and is difficult to control whenever 
                                                 
15  Equivalent to Col$1.760 per kg 
16  Equivalent to Col$2.080 per kg 
NFCG:Renovation Program of Coffee 
Trees 1998-2002 
Years  Renovated 
Hectares 
        1998   62.842  
        1999   73.217  
        2000   60.400  
        2001   43.000  
       2002 (*)   60.000  
(*) Estimated   
Table 3 Source: NFCG 
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harvests come in great volumes and in short periods of time, as is the case in 
intensive plantations. 
§ Colombia’s topography does not permit mechanization alternatives. 
§ Usually small producers are averse to radical technological changes in the 
production chain
17 in cases where there are viable alternatives or additional 
investments are required. 
§ Coffee profits are sensitive to variations in international coffee prices. In view of 
this, intensification is a high-risk decision where losses can be of considerable 
proportions. 
§ Production in intensively cultivated farms is cyclic and regular, but as a monocrop 
is highly sensitive to climatic and environmental conditions. 
§ Coffee in Colombia is an exotic crop, as densities increase it is more pest 
susceptible. Two of coffee’s most notable pests, –namely coffee leaf rust which 
arrived in 1983, and the coffee berry borer which arrived in 1988– in the absence 
of  resistant coffee varietals are more easily controlled under low plant densities. 
 
Production quality 
Quality begins in the field with good agronomic practices and requires well-managed 
harvest and post-harvest processes. Colombia, as a quality leader, has initiated a 
number of such programs over the years. Now, as its position has eroded, more quality 
and market-oriented interventions are necessary in order to elevate Colombian coffee’s 
market advantage. This is especially true as most other producers also rush to invest 
heavily in quality. Among the potential areas of production oriented focus are:  
 
§ Improving the age, variety, and quality of the tree stock  
§ considering the selective development and promotion of high-value heirloom 
varieties in appropriate smallholder growing areas. 
§ Offer options for high-value green production technologies i.e. organic and 
shade-grown 
§ Introducing more quality promotion techniques i.e. cupping labs in rural areas, 
quality competitions like Cup of Excellence events 
§ increased promotion of  coffees from specific Geographic Indications of Origin 
that can promote superior quality. 
 
5.  Production Systems Costs  
 
Colombia’s coffee growing area is located along the Andes mountain range and in the 
Sierra Nevada’s foothills; it is planted between 1000 meters and 2100 meters above sea 
level. However, the social and economic structures affecting coffee production in the 
different coffee r egions, as well as their variance in environmental conditions (soil 
quality, water supply and sunlight), have resulted in production models with quite 
                                                 
17 It should be noted that there is evidence that Colombia's smallholders, perhaps because of 70 years of organized 
extension services and notable successes, are less resistant to radical change than in many other countries.   30
different resources. Under present market conditions data from these allows us to arrive 
at some conclusions as to the future of the regions as coffee producing areas. 
 
In order to examine this regional effect the Center for Regional Studies in Coffee and 
Managerial Studies (CRECE) conducted a study which classified coffee production 
models by region and analyzed how they were facing present production conditions in 
the context of a low cost environment (CRECE, 2001). Even though this resulting 
regionalization is too aggregated to capture important internal differences it is a 
reasonable approximation and the  only analysis currently available. Their regional 
classification was as follows: Central-Western Region, comprising the departments of 
Antioquia, Caldas, Quindío, Risaralda, Tolima and Valle; Eastern Region, comprising 
the departments of Boyacá, Cundinamarca, Norte de Santander and Santander; 
Southern Region, comprising the departments of Cauca, Nariño and Huila; and 
Northern Region, comprising the departments of Cesar, La Guajira and Magdalena. 
Table 3 shows distribution of coffee planted area and  production according to these 
regional classifications Central Western and Southern regions represent 79% of total 
planted area and contribute with 88% of production. 
 
Table 11. 
Distribution of coffee production and planted area by region 
Region  Planted Area  Coffee Prodruction 
Central Western  61%  75% 
Southern  18%  13% 
Eastern  16%  9% 
Northern  5%  3% 
   
Source: CRECE 
 
For the purposes of this analysis regions were characterized mainly  according to 
production technology and farm sizes. 
 
From the point of view of coffee growing technology, production in Colombia can be 
classified as: 1) modern sun exposed plantations, 2) modern tree shaded plantations 
and 3) traditional rustic plantations. The term modern sun exposed refers to high density 
plantations (average densities of 5,100 trees per hectare), with young highly productive 
trees, whose care practices are labor intensive and require high doses of agrochemical 
inputs resulting in high cost structures. Modern tree shaded plantations have an 
average density of 4,300 coffee plants per hectare, and on the whole demand less 
inputs (labor and agrochemicals) because of their shade and lower plant densities. 
These are less productive but their production costs are also lower. Finally traditional 
plantations have average coffee plant densities of 1,800 trees per hectare, are shaded 
by diverse forest canopies, use minimal inputs, and have the lowest cost structures. 
   31
Table 12 shows distribution of  planted area according to technology. Around 75% of 
coffee planted area in both Central Western and Southern regions correspond to 
modern technologies –sun exposed and tree shaded–  while in the Eastern region this 
percentage is just 50% of total area and  in the Northern only 20%. Traditional 
technologies cover 50% of coffee area in the Eastern region and 80% in the northern 
region. Thus technology separates Central-Western and Southern regions from the 
other two, the first ones having a much more modern outlook while the other two, and 






As shown in Table 13, modern technologies contribute with 81% of total Colombian 
production, and in Central-Western and Southern regions these technologies 
respectively produce 85.5% and 81.7% of total regional production. In the Eastern 





Distribution of coffee production by coffee growing technology and 
region  
Region   Technology  
  Sun  Expo.   Tree Shaded    Traditional   
Cent. Western   49,8%   35,7%    14,5%   
Southern   42,4%   39,3%    18,3%   
Eastern   13,0%   50,1%    36,9%   
Northern    5,1%   23,4%    71,5%   
       
Total    44,3%   37,1%    18,6%   
  Source: CRECE   
 
Distribution of coffee planted areas by region and production  
technology  
Region   Technology  
  Sun Expo.    Tree Shaded    Traditional   
Cent. Western
  
41,1%    35,6%    23,3%  
Southern    35,1%    38,6%    26,3%  
Eastern   9,1%    40,9%    50,0%  
Northern    3,3%    16,7%     
       
Total    32,9%  36,1%    31,0%  
 Source: CRECE   
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When analyzing costs the size distribution of coffee farms becomes important due 
primarily to the savings which smaller farms can obtain from non-wage family labor. 
Table 14 shows distribution of coffee farms according to size and region. Small farms 
(between 0.1 and 3 hectares) are predominant in the Southern  and Central-Western 
regions representing 62.7% and 54% of all coffee farms respectively. In the Eastern 
these size farms represent 44.5% and in the Northern just 5.8%. Thus coffee growing 
areas in Southern and Central-Western regions are made up of a majority of small 




According to CRECE’s 2001 report, the highest physical productivity 1,126 kg/ha in the 
Central Western Region, while the other three regions have average productivities of 
around 600 kg/ha (Table 15). As the different production technologies have differing 
productivities in each of the regions, each region’s average productivity is the resulting 
mix between t he three technologies in the particular region. It is important to note the 
productivity differentials between regions for each of the technologies; the Central 
Western having by far the highest productivity, followed distantly by the other three 
regions.  When comparing technologies in terms of productivity, both modern 
technologies do not differ much, while the modern sun exposed has a yield almost twice 










Percentage  of coffee farms by size and region     
Farm size   Regions  
  Cent. 
Western  
Southern    Eastern   Northern   
0.1 -1 ha   25,5%   30,9%   16,8%   1,2%  
1-3 ha   28,9%   31,7%   27,8%   4,6%  
3-5 ha   14,0%   13,6%   15,7%   5,6%  
5-20 ha   24,2%   19,1%   30,8%   33,7%  
>20 ha   7,3%   4,7%   9,0%   54,9%  
   Source: Encuesta Nacional Cafetera 1997     




On the other hand, profitability of each of these models depends not only on their 
physical productivity but also on their production cost structure. The production cost 
structure being used for this analysis includes all costs except the land’s rate of return 
and financial costs. As is shown in Table 16 production costs per hectare differ widely 
between technologies and regions; between technologies the differences are explained 
mainly because the modern and highly productive ones make intensive use of labor and 
agrochemical inputs, and between regions because the different environmental 
conditions demand different quantities of inputs, and the cost of labor varies according 
to regional markets and the percentage of non wage family labor employed. Costs per 
hectare vary widely between technologies and regions. The Central-Western’s sun 
production has the highest costs while the Southern region’s traditional methods have 
the lowest. The costs of the former are more than six times greater than the latter’s.  
Within the Central-Western region costs by technology are less diverse than in the other 
three regions, therefore technology makes less of a difference in terms of costs in the 




Coffee yields by production technology and region  
(Kg per hectare)  
Region   Technology    Average  
  Sun Expo.    Tree 
Shaded   
Traditional     
Cent. Western   1.311    1.080    654   1.126  
Southern   817   669   465   589  
Eastern   691   589   361   604  
Northern    720   682   405   614  
         
Average    885   755   471    
   Source: CRECE  
 
Coffee production costs by technology and 
region  (Col $ per hectare)  
Region   Technology   
  Sun Expo.    Tree 
Shaded   
Traditional   
Cent. 
Western  
2.601.520    2.246.400    1.385.950   
Southern   1.438.800    1.150.250    409.200   
Eastern   1.769.600    1.271.700    722.500   
Northern    1.612.800    1.692.600    486.000   
Source: CRECE  
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The combination of these two effects  –physical productivity and production costs– is 
illustrated in Table 17. According to this data the Southern Region has the lowest costs, 
followed in ascending order, cost wise, by the Central Western, the Northern and finally 
the Eastern Region. When considering technology alone, the less costly structure is the 
Traditional one, while both Modern  –sun exposed and tree shaded– are on average 
equally more costly. 
 
It follows then, that the Southern Region has the highest profitability, followed in 
descending order by the Central Western, the Northern, and finally the Eastern regions. 
 
Table 17. 
Table 18 shows the distribution of costs per kg. of coffee according to technology and 
farm size, that could imply that the smaller farms are the most profitable ones. However, 
since the calculations did not take into account their intensive use of non-wage family 





At the moment world Colombian coffee price is around 0,68 US$/pound which results in 
an average internal coffee price of Col$ 2.472 per kg (this price includes the subsidy of 
Col$ 240 per kg being paid to coffee growers so long as the world price translated into 
Coffee production costs by technology and farm 
size (Col $ per kg)  
Farm size   Technology  
  Sun Expo.    Tree 
Shaded   Traditional   
0.1 -1 h a   1.120    1.240    1.056   
1-3 ha   1.080    1.200    1.040   
3-5 ha   1.720    1.840    1.680   
5-20 ha    2.400    2.560    2.360   
>20 ha   2.560    2.640    2.400   
 Source: CRECE   
 
Coffee production costs by technology and 
region (Col $ per kg)  
Region   Technology   
  Sun Expo.    Tree 
Shaded   
Traditional   
Cent. 
Western  
1. 984   2.080    2.120  
Southern   1.760    1.720    880  
Eastern   2.560    2.160    2.000  
Northern    2.240    2.480    1.200  
 Source: CRECE  
   35
Col$ minus commercialization costs, remains below Col$ 2.544 per kg). Under these 
price circumstances modern technologies are profitable in all regions except for the sun 
exposed in the Eastern region and the tree shaded in the Northern region (Table 9). 
However, as shown in Table 10, with present price levels, all technologies remain 
profitable for farm sizes below 5 hectares. 
 
The more viable production schemes 
 
Supposing that in the near and mid-term world coffee prices will remain low, and that 
public policy towards the sector will not modify the structure of production by 
interventions or subsidies, then some conclusions as to possible evolving tendencies of 
the average structure of the coffee growing sector can be stated, but it is also important 
to acknowledge that production costs and profitability in the field, while vital, are not the 
only components of success in international trade. Quality levels, disease resistance, 
processing/marketing costs, product marketability a nd other variables can potentially 
shift conclusions about which region and maybe even which type of production will 
actually be competitive, especially over the next few years. 
 
1. Low-cost production schemes are very likely to remain feasible in Colombia. This 
means that the Southern Region, in any of the technological structures analyzed, has a 
bright future. The Central Western Region has slightly greater costs per kg and will have 
a positive profitability as long as the coffee price level does not drop further. In future, 
coffee production in the Northern Region may only be viable under the traditional 
technology. The Eastern Region has the highest costs in all considered technologies, 
and therefore could be the one more likely to diversify out due to negative profitability. 
Of course, these are very generalized and relative assessments for the purpose of 
understanding the production potential in each region.  Furthermore, at a more localized 
level considerable variations can take place that obviate these assessments. For 
example, a group of well-run small organic or fair trade farms even in one of the less 
competitive production areas may still be quite profitable, as would an estate producing 
gourmet quality. 
 
2. Non-traditional technologies with higher production yields per area, also incur higher 
input costs, especially labor costs, which in part due to the prevailing price levels are not 
presently offset by greater volumes of production. Therefore, unless there are significant 
gains in input savings and in labor productivity, non-traditional technologies seem to be 
facing a difficult bottleneck cost wise. On the other hand as less productive traditional 
technologies have lower cost structures, especially labor costs, they seem to be better 
placed to survive under present circumstances. 
 
3. From the point of view of farm size, the smallest ones (up until 3 hectares) are the 
ones with higher profitability at present coffee prices; medium farm sizes (3-5 hectares), 
have positive profitability, although less so, and larger ones (>5 hectares) have negative 
profitability. This implies that small coffee farms will tend to succeed in coffee 
production. However, the picture is more complex. The overall profitability of smaller 
farms is contingent on their use of personal and family labor. This of course reduces the 
possibility of laboring remuneratively on other farms, off-farm wage labor, or pursuing   36
other cultivation opportunities thereby diminishing other forms of potential income.  
Valuing this opportunity cost of labor would significantly reduce their real profitability and 
somewhat increase their level of vulnerability.   
 
At the other end of the scale, farmers with coffee areas in excess of 20 hectares are 
known to have economies of scale that help them distribute some of the administrative 
and labor costs. Occasionally farmers of the size may also have readier access to credit 
lines that enable them to weather difficult periods. These larger farms, because of their 
needs and typically higher capitalization,  often provide valuable labor opportunities in 
rural areas that help sustain smaller farmers who work away from their own land and 
wage laborers. 
 
4. Modern coffee production technologies (sun exposed and tree shaded) in larger 
farms may be less viable, primarily due to their high dependence on labor, a factor 
whose cost has risen due to rural-urban migration and by the distorting effect on the 
labor market produced by illegal crops. The greatest incidence of labor on the cost 
structure is in harvesting, but labor substitution would create further problems of rural 
employment. Even if it were possible, substitution with a process of mechanization is 
limited by the mountainous conditions of the coffee growing area. However, labor 
productivity could foreseeably be increased somewhat by rationalizing its use 
throughout the production process and implementing organizational practices that 
optimize it. 
 
6. Post harvest processes 
 
Post-harvesting infrastructure and its impact on quality 
 
According to the 1997 Encuesta Nacional Cafetera, of the nation's 566,230 coffee 
farms, 40% (228,116) have the necessary infrastructure to process around 412,000 
cubic meters of ripened coffee berries; 41% (234.049) dry coffee using direct sunlight, 
and only 2% have drying silos. Sun drying makes use of various facilities such as 
schoolyards, churchyards, patios, roads, etc., not all of them suitable for that purpose. A 
deficient drying process results in a significant increase of pasillas (low quality coffee 
berries). Most coffee growers select better quality coffees from pasillas before selling it, 
so an increase in pasillas at the farm level results in a reduction of the volume of quality 
coffee being produced but not on a reduction of overall quality; however, what does 
happen is a fall in individual producers’ income due to lower prices paid for pasillas. 
 
In general, coffee must reach 12% humidity levels for it to be considered dry; 
incomplete drying processes with a higher percentage of moisture result in ‘wet coffees’ 
which contribute to quality deterioration. Due to deficient drying infrastructure, and 
because of the increasing risk of coffee being stolen from farmers’ premises, in some 
areas of the country wet coffee sales have increased. At present between 20% and 
30% of total coffee being purchased are considered inappropriately ‘wet’. 
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According to Almacafe’s
18 records around 8% of the total purchase between 1990-2000, 
had quality problems; in 2001 this figure reached 522.763 sacks (8.4% of total 
purchased production) 40% of w hich were rejections due to “off" aromas and flavors 
picked up due to poor drying/storage and also to overuse or subsequent contact with 
agrochemicals. Most of the quality problems have arisen in deficient drying 
infrastructure. 
 
Almacafe functions as the NFCG's logistical operator and plays the key role in the post 
harvest commercialization process both domestically and externally.  It manages a 
national network of warehouses that collect, store, process, inspect, and ship 30%-35% 
of Colombia's coffee. From these warehouses credit is extended to cooperatives for 
their local purchases of coffee. The strategic locations of their offices and their 
consistent and ready access to financing provide fast liquidity to the cooperatives and 
the farmers who form them even in some of the more remote rural areas. Almacafe also 
checks the standards (weight and quality) of all the coffee that passes into its storage 
facilities providing a valuable control point.  Its own ISO 9000 certification facilitates a 
high international standard of operation.  In the warehouses visual inspection is 
complemented by sophisticated cupping laboratories that maintain complete records of 
tests. It is from these warehouses that samples are sent and approvals received from 
overseas buyers. Almacafe also manages the collection of the export tax or 
“contribución”. 
 
Ecological management of byproduct and waste 
 
The majority of the world’s fresh water is used for agriculture and coffee processing also 
uses considerable quantities. What is more important is that the typical use of this water 
for processing creates considerable pollution as a result of the contaminant by-products 
which remain in the water. Indeed, a midsize processing operation can cause as much 
water pollution as a small town. Colombia has been at the forefront with new pulping 
and washing innovations and efforts have been made by the NFCG to preserve water 
sources: river banks have been reforested and both public and private facilities have 
been built for the decontamination of processing water and the appropriate processing 
of solid farm wastes. 
 
CENICAFE has developed what is known as the ecologically friendly post-harvesting 
system, BECOLSUB
19. This system can reduce water demand during processing by 
more than 95%. The conventional process uses 50 liters of water per kilogram of dried 
coffee, while the BECOLSUB uses only 1 liter of water. As a consequence of its 
reduced water use this system reduces polluting by-products that enter waterways by 
90%.   
 
So far nearly 12,000 coffee-farms are using this new method. However, because of its 
considerable expense, it is only available to smaller farmers when they can organize 
adequately to invest in and manage the BECOLSUB. 
                                                 
18 ALMACAFE is the Federation’s coffee storage and logistics facility for internal and external commercialization of 
coffee. 
19 BECOLSUB stands for Beneficiadero Ecológico con Manejo de Subproductos which translates into Ecologically 
Friendly Processing System with Byproduct Management. Dr. Black of the University of the Andes, has conducted a 
thorough evaluation of this technology.    38
 
Today, there are no economic incentives to rationalize water usage because 
contamination and excessive usage during coffee post-harvesting is not a problem 
affecting coffee’s cost structure. On the other hand, increasing social pressure has 
turned it into a priority of considerable proportions. In the future, water contamination 
will be an additional cost facing coffee producers once the already sanctioned water 
contamination tax begins to be enforced.  However, a possible solution to encourage 
small farmers to adopt environmentally friendly technology could be the channeling of 
tax revenues coming from the enforcement of the contamination tax to help them 
finance their investment in the BECOLSUB and related technologies. In that way the tax 
would also be contributing directly to reducing contamination. 
 
Other simple and low-cost improvements can also be implemented to reduce water use 
and its contact time with coffee contaminants. According to NFCG’s Technical 
Management, water usage could be reduced from 50 liters per kilo of dried coffee to 
somewhere around 10 liters by simply rationalizing its usage. Research and cost benefit 
analyses could help to develop a set of general solution for all coffee growers 
regardless of size. 
 
7.  Marketing 
 
Internal Market Channels 
 
Colombia enjoys relatively efficient and diverse internal channels for marketing its 
coffee. Exporters, either private or NFCG, purchase two different types of coffee in the 
internal market: parchment and green coffee.  For the parchment coffee there are two 
marketing channels from the growers:  intermediaries and coops. For the year 2001, the 
intermediaries purchased 56% of the production and the coops purchased 44%. 
 
There are two kinds of intermediaries; those who purchase coffee at their own risk, 
which means with their own financial resources, expecting to m ake a margin in the 
process, and those who buy coffee on behalf of private exporters, who provide them 
with funds.  The intermediaries who purchase coffee at their own risk have no enforcing 
commitments to sell to their clients, so they are free to sell their coffee to whomever 
gives them the best price.  They usually sell to private exporters but they can also sell it 
to millers who transform the parchment coffee into green exportable coffee and, in turn, 
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Coops were created in part as the purchasing arm of the NFCG. Though initially the 
FNC sponsored them, today they are mostly autonomous and have their own 
management and financial controls. There are 40 coops nationwide that own 500 
purchasing points. The Coops can sell either to the NFCG or to Expocafé, their own 
coffee exporter.  The NFCG can supply them with the financial resources to purchase 
the coffee if it is sold to NFCG. This cash advance, routed through Almacafe is cost 
free. However, if they sell to Expocafé, using the funds provided by the NFCG, they are 
charged 15% simple fees on the borrowed funds. They can only sell to Private 
Exporters if they use their own financial resources for purchasing the coffee.   
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Figure 2. Coffee Flows from Growers to Market 
 
Green coffee is purchased in the internal market through coops or through millers.  
Private exporters usually buy from the millers, who expect to make their profits on the 
yield of transforming the parchment into green coffee and the value of the coffee sub-
products market.  Sub-products are the remaining low quality coffee products resulting 
after parchment coffee is milled. They are sold to the national industry for processed 
coffees.  The decision of the coops to sell green or parchment coffee also relies heavily 
on the value of the sub-products market. If the price for these sub-products is 
competitive they prefer to sell green coffee and market the sub-products separately.   
 
 
Costs of marketing 
 
The marketing costs can be divided into two groups:  the costs of the purchasing agent, 
and the costs of the exporter.  Grower marketing costs tend to be very low in Colombia 
and oscillate between 1.2% and 1.4% of the total export cost (currently equivalent to 
less than US$ .01 per pound)
20 The purchasing agent’s costs encompass everything 
between the  moment when the coffee is bought from the grower until the moment it is 
sold to the private exporter. The costs of the exporter include all the costs of 
transforming the raw material (parchment) and delivering the final product (green 
beans) to the client. The marketing costs for the coops are described in the following 





                                                 
20 This consists primarily of transport and packaging. There are, of course very significant variations based on a 



















Source: NFCG   41
  Table 4. 
Costs of Marketing for 
COOPS 
Us¢/lb.  % of FOB 
Labor costs  0.34  0.56% 
Transportation  0.61  1.00% 
Transportation insurance  0.11  0.17% 
Financial costs and taxes  0.18  0.30% 
Fixed costs  0.37  0.61% 
Other costs  0.50  0.82% 
Total  2.11  3.47% 
  Source: Consolidated report of the coops for the year 2001  
 
There is no reliable data for intermediaries’ marketing costs. However, evidence clearly 
indicates that costs, as well as margins, vary significantly from region to region and 
appear to depend on the presence of coops in their particular market.  For instance it is 
known that in the areas where there are no coops, intermediaries pay a price that is 
between 10% and 70% less than the equivalent “theoretical” price of the NFCG
21.  This 
can be explained in part by less competition and in part by the higher costs of operating 
in areas that are less remunerative for various reasons including distance to market, 
low-volume, and high security risk.  
 
The average cost of marketing for exporters is described in the Table below
22.  It is 
important to notice that in addition to the costs of transformation, there is an important 













                                                 
21 Study done by the Coops Division at NFCG in December 2001.  Difference in prices in the towns where coops 
have been closed:  
San Adolfo (Huila)  -10% 
Arboleda (Caldas)  -20% 
Vergara ( Cundinamarca)  -40% 
Garagoa (Boyacá)  -70% 
 
22 “The Exporters’ Account” as of April 23th, 2002.     42
Table 5 
Source: “The Exporters’ Account” April 2002.  Average costs for exporters published by NFCG daily.   
 
 
There is a tax for all exporters who, in turn, transfer this cost to the growers.  This tax, 
which is charged for every pound of green coffee exported, is called “contribución 
cafetera”.  The structure of the amount to be paid is decided by the National Committee 
which acts as the board of directors of the National Coffee Fund.  For the year 2002, the 
amount of “contribución cafetera” varies according to the level of the Colombian FOB 
sale price. Therefore, on April 23rd, 2002 the total cost of marketing was US.076/lb. 









The NFCG holds among its responsibilities transferring a fair market price to coffee 
growers and guaranteeing the purchase of all coffees offered which comply with pre-




Transportation insurance 0.24 0.39%
Milling 1.73 2.84%
Bags 0.45 0.74%
Port tariffs 0.63 1.04%
Overhead 0.94 1.54%
Opportunity cost 0.43 0.71%
Income for selling the sub-products (2.05) -3.37%
Total internal costs for exporters 3.32 5.46%
External Costs
Financial costs 1.10 1.81%
Collection commision 0.15 0.25%
Sales commission 0.32 0.53%
Total external costs for exporters 1.57 2.58%
Total Costs for Exporters 4.89 8.04%
Costs of Marketing
Us¢/lb.  % of FOB price
Costs for Coops 2.11 3.47%
Costs for Exporters 4.89 8.04%
Contribución Cafetera 0.60 0.99%
Net costs from purchasing point to FOB 7.60 12.50%  43
transferring to the coffee growers as much of the sales price as possible, only deducting 
from it the costs of marketing.   
 
The NFCG has an everyday presence buying coffee in the market and publicly 
announcing its purchasing price daily.  
 
A common market practice by other purchasing agents and exporters is to use the 
NFCG public price as a benchmark for calculating their own prices according to their 
coffee supply needs. Therefore, under liberal market conditions, this mechanism helps 
coffee growers negotiate a transparent price. 
 
When the NFCG announces its daily purchasing price, each of the agencies of the 
NFCG logistics operator (Almacafe S.A) discounts transportation costs in order to 
calculate a purchasing price at their corresponding geographical location. Coops, in 
turn, discount their own margins as well as transportation costs from each of their 
purchasing points. At times, the large margins discounted by coops, compared to those 
of intermediaries, can significantly reduce the price received by coffee growers or even 
make them on competitive with intermediaries.    
 
Farmers % of FOB market price  
According to the costs of marketing described above, and given that the NFCG’s price 
is generally used as the benchmark, farmers in April 2002 received around 87.5% of the 
FOB price, when selling their coffee through the coop system. The general average 
over the last 10 years has been between 70-75%.This percentage may very significantly 




Buyers of Colombian coffee have constantly paid a significant premium over the The 
New York Board of Trade (NYBOT)
23 coffee contract price because of its quality and 
consistency. 
 
The national government through the FNC has delegated to the NFCG the 
determination of green bean quality standards for export, as well as the responsibility of 
conducting export quality control processes. 
 
The final quality control evaluations take place at port, where the product characteristics 
are verified against the exporting standards. The cargo is sampled on a 100% basis, 
and analyzed to determine: size, weight and shape of the beans, moisture, physical 
defects, aroma, color and cup taste. The NFCG has the power to stop any shipment. 
 
All agents, processors, and exporters, therefore find themselves compelled to inspect 
their product. Coffee sellers whose product fulfills all purchasing quality requirements 
are paid the complete current price. When offering a quality different from the standard, 
                                                 
23 The New York Board of Trade is home to the Coffee, Cocoa, and Sugar Exchange sometimes called the "C" 
market and its listed contract prices set the  benchmark for arabica coffee being trading.   44
they will be charged a discount or in some cases receive a bonus accounting for the 
differences. 
 
Size and realistic growth of potential domestic market 
 
One of the opportunities in such a low price market is the development of domestic 
markets that have not grown in recent years
24.  While the current economic situation 
appears to make this difficult it is still a worthwhile long-term strategy to pursue. With 
adequate stimulus the results could be considerable. A similar social profile in Brazil has 
responded to initiatives in recent years that have dramatically grown its domestic market 
to become the world's second-largest consumer of coffee. A similar growth rate in 
Colombia could add more than a million bags of coffee to current consumption thereby 
nearly doubling its domestic consumption in just a few years.  
 
Between 1968 and 1986 domestic consumption of coffee grew at an annual rate of 4.6 
%.  This was in great part due to the NFCG's price subsidies for the domestic coffee 
market.  When these subsidies ended after 19 years in 1987, the domestic consumer 
price rose 140% plunging the per capita consumption 33% to around 1.5 million bags. 
Despite some subsequent growth in consumption in 1998 the internal market was about 
1,550,000 bags.  The recent economic downturn shows internal consumption for the 
year 2001 was between 1,200,000 and 1,350,000 60kg. bags. The lower end of the 
range is the estimate of the main coffee roasters and the upper number is the one of the 
NFCG.   
 
Consumption has decreased, as a result of a reduction in the number of cups per 
capita, rather than a loss in the actual number of consumers. A significant part of the 
market for roasted coffee has been replaced by soluble coffee. While in 1988 this kind 
of coffee had a share of the market of 6%, for the year 2001 it had increased to 12%.  
One of the primary reasons or this shift appears to be reduced consumer purchasing 
power since there is evidence that other beverages such as juice and soda have also 
failed to grow. The consumer price index and Colombia had an average annual growth 
rate of nearly 22% during the 1990s. Another factor is the change in breakfast habits 
favoring speedier preparation and consumption.   
 
The International Marketing Chain 
 
There is strong empirical evidence showing that the gap between coffee export prices 
and retail prices has been increasing in the last twenty years. In a paper published by 
the World Bank Economic Review, Morisset (1998) indicated that between 1975 and 
1993 the external  price of coffee declined by 18% while the retail price paid by 
consumers increased 240%. He was not able to fully explain this result as a 
consequence of increasing costs or new trade barriers. Many coffee experts believe that 
market structures and the growing bargaining power of international coffee traders and 
roasters is one of the main factors behind this phenomenon. 
 
                                                 
24 2.09 kg green coffee per capita and reduction from 2.0 cups per day in 1997 to 1.8 cups per day in 1999 according 
to Federación Nacional de Cafeteros. 1999. Estudio de Consumo en las 5 Principales Ciudades.   45
There is clearly a growing imbalance in the distribution of resources along the supply 
chain, within the global coffee economy. During the years when the economic clauses 
of the International Coffee Agreement were in operation (1980's), final consumers were 
spending around $30 billion and about one third reached the producing countries ($10 
billion). According to the ICO and other sources, in the year 2000 consumers spent 55-
57 billion and producers got around 7.5 billion, that is around 15%.  For the year 2002, 
Nestlé estimates that the world will drink 765 billion cups of coffee (in home and out 
home consumption) with a market value of 80  billion dollars. If coffee producers 
continue to get an average price of only 40 cents per pound, they will get less than 5 
billion dollars in revenue this year, which is less than 7% of the retail value. 
 
These estimates are consistent with information from other sources. In 1989 the 
Economist Intelligence Unit prepared a chart breaking down the retail price of washed 
coffees into its main components. According to that estimation, producing countries 
were getting about 40% of the retail price at the FOB level. A similar exercise carried 
out by the NFCG in April 2002 shows that in the case of Colombian coffee, even with its 
premium reputation, this proportion is now less than 22%.  
 
Another way of looking at this issue is to compare retail prices with unit value of coffee 
imports for the main coffee consuming countries. According to the chart below, after 
growth from the 1991 nadir, the relation between these two variables has almost halved 
since 1995. In the case of the UK soluble market, robusta prices (the primary 
component of most soluble coffee) represented 14% of the UK retail price in 1998 and 
only 7.6% in the year 2000 (Charveriat) 
25. 
 
Not all of the loss of the growers' share in the final value is due to the concentration of 
the commercialization chain.  A part is due to the new value added to the product in the 
consuming countries.  Part of this is in the transformation process i.e. flavoring and 
decaffeinating and part is at the retail preparation level where the increase in the 
volume and price paid for coffees has been dramatic.  The Seattle-style coffees that are 
an important driver in the growth of specialty coffees overall, involve many milk-based 
beverages whose proportion of coffee is actually quite small. In these cafes a 16 oz. 
cappuccino typically has only two ounces of coffee. An average specialty coffee 
beverage may contain only 1/45 pound of coffee for which a grower may receive about 
US $.01. What is often excluded from this analysis is that an average of $1.25 in the 
U.S. for a cup of specialty coffee must also include: one or two middlemen, roasting 
losses, preparation losses, milk, sweeteners and condiments, cups, wages, equipment 
costs, insurance, rents, and operating and capital costs. Although this explains some of 
the value added at the consumer level, the specialty market is still a tiny fraction of the 
overall market and it does not account for the widening disparity between producer 





                                                 









Colombia's publicity campaign is undoubtedly the world's best-known. Indeed its 
trademark and logos are as widely recognized as many highly valued consumer brands. 
See Chart. This is certainly no small feat and merits recognition. Colombia's publicity 
has clearly been effective.  
 
The publicity programs of Juan Valdéz and “100% Colombian Coffee” are part of a 
sophisticated and diversified Colombian strategy to increase the premium price paid for 
Colombian coffee. They include publicity campaigns in the print media, at both live and 
televised up sporting particularly in the USA. In the early days of its promotional 
programs the NFCG also contributed a share in cooperative advertising expenses to a 
number of U.S. roasters to encourage their promotion of 100% Colombian coffee with 
the Juan Valdéz and “100% Colombian coffee” logos. With its reputation firmly 







                                                 
26 Group represents 83% of consumption among consumer countries ICO 
COFFEE VALUES IN MAIN IMPORTING COUNTRIES 
Retail coffee prices and CIF value of green coffee component   
  1990   1995  2000   2001 
  (1)  (2)  %  (1)  (2)  %  (1)      %  (1)  (2)  % 
            Sales Program for Specialty  2002             
USA   2,89   0,72  25  4,11   1,59   39  3,63   1  28  3,21   0,61   19 
Denmark  3,62   0,65  18  5,74   1,8  31  3,65   0,99   27  3,36   0,64   19 
Germany    4,35   0,75  17  6,05   1,84   30  3,62   0,9   25  3,26   0,58   18 
France  2,71   0,67  25  4,06   1,61   40  2,32   0,81   35  2,05   0,52   25 
Italy   5,05   0,75  15  5,44   1,53   28  4,62   0,79   17  4,4   0,61   14 
Spain   3,37   0,66  20  4,41   1,57   36  2,82   0,72   26  -  0,44   - 
Japan    9,57   0,78  8  17,6   1,7  10  15,8   1,06   7  9,16   0,66   7 
(1) Retail Price of roasted coffee (US$/pound)   
(2) Unitary value of green coffee imports (US$/pound)   
 
 
Sources: ICO EB 3557/95 (C); Coffee Statistics March/01 and NFCG: Special Studies April 4 2002  












     
Quaker Oats  94  77 
CBS  90  65 
Volkswagen  90  84 
100% Colombian Coffee  85  53 
Nike  84  79 
Michelin  73  49 
Prudential  72  4 
United Diary Association  68  4 
AT&T  62  34 
Woolmark  40  13 
Starbucks  33  19 
Continental   32  8 
     
Source:  2000 Logo Study—Roper Starch Worldwide. Courtesy NFCG 
 
Coffee producers have invested approximately 500 million dollars on Colombian 
coffee's promotional strategy since 1959. While no one questions the phenomenal 
success of Colombia's publicity program, its considerable expense inevitably raises the 
question of a cost-benefits analysis. However, it is difficult to adequately differentiate 
how much of the premium price received by Colombian coffee is actually related, 
directly and indirectly, to the publicity and even more difficult to do this looking back 
over a 43 year period. It is further difficult to gauge the collateral benefits of a brand that 
has been noted to improve the country's overall image. 
 
A recent paper by the University of Maryland's Dr. Lozano
27 modeled a proof for the 
hypothesis that  the brand strategy pursued by the NFCG’s "Juan Valdez" and "100% 
Colombian Coffee” has had a positive and large effect on the aforementioned 
Colombian green coffee premium. According to Dr. Lozano at least half the premium 
can indeed be explained by the segmentation strategy pursued by the "100% 
Colombian" program.  Among the other explanations for the premium price were 
arbitrage and the relative scarcity of Colombian Coffee with respect to other substitute 
qualities. The paper does not include a cost-benefit analysis of that strategy.  
 
Harvard professor Rohit Deshpande notes in his case study of Colombian coffee (de 
Royere & Deshpande, 2001) that its promotional campaigns have been highly effective 
                                                 
27 The article, an econometric assessment, was prepared at the request of the New York office of the National 
Federation of Coffee Growers of Colombia. The NFCG compiled the background on the 100% Colombian Coffee 
Program as well as the data used for the empirical analysis.   48
and have also benefited the country's image. He notes that it is perhaps the most 
successful such campaign for a product from a developing country. Deshpande and his 
co-author, Alexandra de Royere, mention that other products such as Chilean wine and 
Argentine beef have been unable to match the success of Colombia's coffee promotions 
in great part because of their lack of strong and coordinated sector organizations like 
Colombia's NFCG. 
 
Capturing added value in the commercialization chain 
 
Colombia's brand development and unified marketing are a positive byproduct of a 
unified coffee industry and set it apart from all other producing countries. Its pioneering 
marketing approaches have been unparalleled in the coffee world. In some categories, 
for example U.S. supermarkets, it has continued to grow its participation over the last 
two decades for its "100% Colombian" brand. In other markets however, like Germany’s 
commercial blends, it has lost share. There is concern that it may have lost touch with 
the market's direction in recent years when it did not generate new strategic 
commercialization initiatives to address the erosion of its leadership position in the 
quality arena. Given its loss of share in major blends to lower quality competitors the 
quality arena is probably where it has its best competitive advantage. Although in recent 
years it has created only a few significant opportunities (i.e.a soluble product and soft 
drink) for its brand to directly capture value in downstream activities it has opportunities 
for much more. This is especially true considering t hat its heavy investments in its 
consumer branding that have resulted in unparalleled awareness. See Chart.  
 




































































































































































Source:  Macro International, Inc.—2000 Coffee Tracking Study. 
 
For decades, Colombia developed a quality niche as producer and supplier of green 
beans in world coffee markets. Meanwhile, on the demand side of the market, roasters 
have shown a remarkable capacity to add value to raw material (green beans). In so   49
doing, these actors have been able to create and develop a number of brands and 
capture value by targeting segmented and fragmented consumer markets. While 
Colombian producers have obtained a respectable decade average of US$.10 premium 
over most other mild coffees
28,  firms in consuming nations have captured increasingly 
larger downstream margins. In changing world markets, it must not only address 
competition from other producers but also from other actors along the supply chain.  
 
The NFCG is a leader in using the Internet for its operations including the streamlining 
of logistics and document handling for its transactions. This certainly reduces costs and 
errors making them more competitive.   
 
Differentiated Markets  
 
Conceptually the overall market can be perceived as a quality pyramid with inexpensive 
soluble coffee at the bottom, standard commercial blends in the middle, and 
progressing toward high-end differentiated coffee at the top.  While the top and bottom 
are growing at a healthy pace, the vast middle section has been stagnant. Colombia’s 
general position is primarily in this middle tier and therefore presents a challenge in 
order to find sustainable future growth. 
 
The differentiated markets could be valuable tools with which to earn higher revenues 
and superior market reputation. Even though Colombia managed to successfully 
differentiate its coffee as a higher quality alternative in the mass market for many years, 
this particular generic differentiator is increasingly less valid in today's competitive 
environment. While this can  continue to serve as one component of its strategy, it 
probably can no longer be the only component. Various differentiated options can be 
valuable to help it benefit from leveraging its quality-oriented competitive advantage.  
These differentiated markets can and often do overlap each other.  They include: 
 
§ Geographic Indications of Origin 
§ Gourmet and Specialty 
§ Organic 
§ Fair Trade 
§ Eco-friendly or shade grown 
 
Its "100% Colombian" campaign is still successful and will continue as it accounts for 
approximately 2.5 million bags. However, Colombia's first mover advantage in the 
differentiated and quality market has been overtaken by more sophisticated 
segmentations such as those listed above. Even though these markets are still relatively 
small, they have demonstrated a consistent and rapid growth rate. Colombia has not 
successfully identified itself with these markets or secured a significant market position 
there. Furthermore, lower-cost substitutions with unwashed Arabicas, other milds, and 
even Robustas have reduced its share in many blends and made its quality proposition 
                                                 
28 Some others, Guatemala, for example enjoy equal and sometimes higher premiums albeit for smaller production 
quantities.   50
less viable. A brief discussion of the primary characteristics of the major differentiated 
markets and their current trends follows in Annex II. The primary reasons for their 
importance as part of a strategy include: 
 
1.   Consistent high growth rates 
2.  Price premiums 
3.  Address global social and environmental concerns    
4.  Access market niches that are competitively different 
5.  Provide positive externalities in the field 
Colombia’s Efforts to Develop Differentiated Coffees 
The NFCG has had commercialization projects for specialty coffees since 1995
29. 
Although these efforts began later than in some other producing countries, the NFCG 
program has nevertheless already help to register 54 brands and launch 72 production 
projects of specialty coffees with an annual export potential of 500,000 60Kg. bags. 
Many private exporters also promote these coffees and the total mid-term potential is 
estimated at 1.5 million  bags. 
 
The table below illustrates the NFCG exports of these types of coffee. On average 
these coffees have been sold at prices around US$.90 per pound in 2001. This 
represents an approximate 14% average increase over the average coffee export price 





Differentiated Coffee Sales by the NFCG 
(60 kg bags) 
Type  1999  2000  2001 
GIO and Gourmet  109,500  187,900  228,400 
Exotics  7,100  5,700  20, 300 
Organics  1,000  600  2,100 
TOTAL  117,600  194,200  250,800 
Source: author compiled from NFCG data 
 
 
There are also been some advanced and rather creative initiatives. In 1999 the NFCG 
tried to develop a program of organic freeze dried coffee; 100,000 kgs of dried coffee 
                                                 
29 The term Specialty coffees here refers to different types of coffee depending on their particular quality 
characteristics such as physical and organoleptic properties, growing and planting practices, geographic origin, which 
make them elegible for a special premium price in the world market.   51
were processed and sold in the international market. However the project was not 
continued because of marketing difficulties which resulted in 17 tons of the product not 
being sold. At the moment efforts are being made to obtain approval of the Japanese 
Ministry of Agriculture for its sale to Japan. 
 
Other isolated projects of organic coffees, particularly in the Sierra Nevada de Santa 
Marta, are being set up slowly, but so far their production potential is less than 10,000 
bags per year, so that Colombia’s participation in this market continues to be  very low. 
This is also the case with fair trade coffees whose sales barely reach 30,000 coffee 
bags a year with a capacity of almost double that.  Its efforts with eco- friendly coffees 
have so far been limited to a handful of scattered private efforts. 
 
Developments in production and commercialization of specialty coffees are incipient, 
the NFCG has already identified 86 potential producing areas according to their 
environmental, climatic and soil conditions. However there are still bottlenecks to be 
resolved in production and post-harvesting processes for the coffees produced in those 
regions. 
 
In 2002 projected sales are expected to increase of approximately 20%. The table 








Options to Capture Value  
 
Colombia’s price premium notwithstanding, much of Colombian coffee production is no 
longer very profitable at current world prices. One solution is the possibility of capturing 
part of the downstream margins. Colombia is in a unique position among producers to 
consider options such as selling its own brands in the processed mainstream retail 
markets in coffee consuming countries or developing private label business. To secure 
 
Program Specialty Sales 2002   
60 kilo bags   
 
Types  North America    Europe  Japan    TOTAL 
Exo  tics  10,000    3,000    3,000    16,000   
Or  ganics  500    2,000    2,000      
Supremos  2,000    2,000    6,000    10,000   
Regional GIO    45,000    30,000  60,000    135,00   
Branded    5,000    10,000  15,000    30,000   
Single Estate    1,500    1,000    2,000    4,500   
Emerald Mountain        100,000    100,000   
Total  64,000    48,000  188,000    300,000   
Source: NFCG 2002   
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value in changing world markets, it must not only address competition from other 
producers but also from other actors along the supply chain. One of the priorities for the 
NFCG should be to independently evaluate its brand strategies to optimize its value to 
its owners. 
 
An analysis of the NFCG experience in this would be a wise first step since entering 
consumer markets is not easy. However the potential advantages of leveraging the 
enormous investment in this brand appear to outweigh the risks.  There are risks of 
damaging historically good relations with roasters and food multinationals, and the 
difficulty of positioning Colombian brands, given the oligopsonic power of giant 
distributors and food brokers.  
 
Entering into the competitive world of roasting may provide benefits but it is doubtful that 
the producer will receive a better price whether his coffee is roasted domestically or 
externally.  Caution should be exercised in any consideration of vertically integrating the 
value chain, because the resulting learning curve could cause considerable 
inefficiencies thereby reducing investment returns, and risking reputation if  markets are 
poorly served. If entering the markets were considered, then a partnership with a major 
participant (a roaster or a food multinational) to finance and execute it would be ideal, 
perhaps using Juan Valdez or the logo as contributing capital.   
 
Apart from mainstream branding strategies, for some of its production Colombia could 
also follow the example of Jamaica and other countries by investing more in a different 
sort of branding in its Geographic Indications of Origin, much as Blue Mountain and 
Antigua have done to develop exclusive competitive advantages.  To do so it will have 
to clarify the definitions of these regions and legally protect them with adequate judicial 
recourse that can even be supported by trade associations in the United States and EU 
that are willing to help develop these systems and help monitor and protect their use in 
the market.  The basic promotional investment and legal adaptations could yield 
potentially high proprietary benefits. 
 
The NFCG also offers excellent web sites for consumers and domestic as well as 
international clients
30. Despite early forays into Internet sales auctions it has not elected 
to aggressively pursue B2B or B2C e-commerce as an option.  
 
 Supporting necessary extension training and certification of organic or fair-trade coffee 
not only provides producers with potential added value (price premiums and currently 
strong market demand) but also provides significant externalities such as improved 
environmental management, participation in a system of improving standards, and 
community-level organizational support. Again, only a limited portion of production will 
be able to enter these markets. 
 
In a related area, Colombian can eventually leverage its eco- friendly and organic coffee 
experience capitalize on the market value of the biodiversity considerations inherent in 
many productive processes besides coffee.  This includes medicinal plants, tropical 
fruits, ornamental plants, tea, nontimber forest products, cacao, wood, mariculture, and 
                                                 
30 www.juanvaldez.com   and   www.cafedecolombia.com   53
many more products. Carbon sequestration is also an emerging instrument that 
leverages environmental regulatory measures to potentially add value to sustainable 
agricultural practices that protect the environment. 
 
Finally, there are a number of creative ways to diversify income generating opportunities 
that are immediately available. For example the NFCG could leverage their existing 
access to a large and organized number of growers in a number of ways that can 
benefit both. These can include renting infrastructure access to underused warehouses, 
reselling transportation space taking advantage of its ability to purchase transport at 
bulk transport rates, facilitating dedicated Internet use on its existing network, making 
the membership available for relevant commercial offers, and group procurement even 
for products beyond coffee related inputs such as farm equipment and even foods. 
 
8.  The Institutions and their Roles  
 
The NFCG was established in 1927 as a private non-profit organization by the coffee 
growers.  It implements regulatory policy for what has been called the most regulated 
sector in Colombia according to the decisions of the National Coffee Committee, the  
public-private body that acts as the managing board of the National Coffee Fund (FNC). 
Hence, as the implementer of policy and manager of the public funds of the NCF, it is 
the sector’s dominant institution by far.  
 
Under new leadership as of mid 2002, The NFCG is not only the pivotal sectoral 
institution at the national level but also a valuable resource for its reach and importance 
at the local levels and its very considerable experience and achievements in the 
international arena. While not a perfect organization, it is nevertheless regarded as the 
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Box 1. 
Structure and functions of NFCG 
 
 
The Municipal Committees are local bodies composed of producing members that are 
responsible for organizing and representing coffee growers at the municipal level and 
acting as their spokesmen in the departmental committees.  There are committees in all 
municipalities having at least 400 coffee farms.  Election to the committees are 
conducted every three years.  The electoral process is democratic and office is open to 
all coffee growers who are members of the NFCG. 
 
The Departmental Committees manage programs and represent the collection of 
municipalities at the regional/departmental level.  They are composed of six members 
and their alternates and are elected  by the municipal committees.  There are 15 
departmental committees: Antioquia, Boyacá, Caldas, Cauca, Cesar-Guajira, 
Cundinamarca, Huila, Magdalena, Nariño, Northern Santander, Quindío, Risaralda, 
Santander, Tolima and Valle.  
 
The General Management  oversees all programs of the national level including 
marketing, financial, technical research, extension services, quality control, and 
planning functions. It carries out the decisions of National Coffee Fund (FNC) conveyed 
through FNC’s National Coffee Committee. It also serves as an international liaison to 
develop and execute marketing strategies. The General Manager of the NFCG is 
directly elected by the Coffee Congress and represents Colombia in all international 
coffee negotiations. 
 
The National Coffee C ommittee is composed of eight representatives of coffee 
producers, along with the Ministers of Finance, External Relations, Trade and 
Agriculture, and the Director of the National Planning Department. Each has one vote 
with the exception of the Finance Minister who has the same number of votes as all the 
producer representatives put together. The Committee meets regularly to define coffee 
policy, and approve budgets and investment strategies of the National Coffee Fund.  
  
The National Executive Committee is composed exclusively of the representatives of 
the coffee producers on the National Coffee Committee, meets regularly, and manages 
the NFCG’s internal affairs following the decisions issued by the National Coffee 
Congress that pertain to it. 
 
The National Coffee Congress is composed of elected representatives from all of the 
coffee growing departments accorded proportionally to each department’s share of 
Colombia's total production. They meet annually to approve NFCG budget and the 
election of members to serve on the National Coffee Committee.   55
 
The National Coffee Fund (FNC) is Colombia's primary policy instrument and acts 
according to the decisions of the National Coffee Committee, the public-private body 
that serves as the managing board of the FNC. The key historical objectives of the FNC 
were to manage finances and policies in order to guarantee the internal price paid to 
producers and to regulate the supply and demand of green coffee primarily through the 
use of warehoused stocks. It was originally created to meet Colombia's quota 
obligations established under the Inter-American Coffee Agreement of 1940 wherein its 
simple purpose was to buy any amounts of coffee in excess of the quota. Its functions 
were subsequently expanded to also serve as a financial mechanism to stabilize 
domestic prices.   
 
The FNC has been reasonably effective as a price stabilization scheme, as evidenced 
by the fact that the internal domestic price volatility over the past 26 years has been half 
that of the world coffee price volatility as measured by the coffee futures index. 
However, coffee price stabilization has come at a cost that especially at times of low 
world prices has been significant.  
 
By the early 1990s the FNC had diversified its holdings, primarily the unspent reserves 
from the coffee tax, by owning financial corporations, a shipping line, an airline, real 
estate and a bank. A series of events led to a precarious financial condition for the FNC 
and this rapidly deteriorated after 1999
31 in part as a result of low prices that eliminated 
much of its special coffee tax revenue. Eventually the floor price mechanism that it 
supported had to be abandoned in January 2001. Its assets slipped from $1.5 billion in 
1995 to $400 million (mostly not liquid) in December of 2001. This meant few resources 
left for the implementation of coffee policy prompting the Colombian government to the 
rescue with an aid package. See Annex. 
 
Its current financial condition is complex and its good credit rating has enabled it to take 
on debt to finance some of its work. Although leaner, it nevertheless retains much of its 
previous character and structure. It appears clear now that the improvement of its 
accountability and transparency are vital for an institution at its level of sectoral and 
national importance. It's most important functions include:  
 
•  price setting  
•  the provision of goods and services such as research, extension, and 
infrastructure 
•  guaranteed purchase of the coffee produced 
•  quality control 
•  sales and marketing overseas 
 
A number of  these functions overlap and occasionally provide useful economies of 
scale. However, it is more likely that the mixing of these functions also permits 
considerable inefficiencies. A recent report by the Comisión de Ajuste de la 
                                                 
31 Most of NCF’s accumulated assets including the bank, the financial corporations, shipping company and others 
were lost.   56
Institucionalidad Cafetera (CAIC)
32 judges that the cost of institutional expenditure - an 
average of $.16 per pound over the last decade - was "excessive”. CAIC likewise notes 
that many of the FNC's functions ought to operate independently with clearly separated 
accountability and resources. Such an institutional scheme will probably encourage 
more transparency and better management. 
 
Since NFCG has been forced to slash its staffing and expenditures its capacity has 
suffered and caused a certain vacuum in the delivery of its many public functions 
(technical assistance, research, publicity for "Café de Colombia", health and education 
services, and other special programs). In 1996 US$.22 per pound was spent on these 
functions. In the year 2001 this sum shrank to US$.10 per pound and fell to its current 
low of US$.05 per pound in 2002. This amount is currently being covered primarily by 
the FNC from its resources and loans since prices are to low to recover a meaningful 
tax from producers. 
 
For decades, the NFCG has guaranteed a “minimum price” for all coffee produced in 
the country. Such price smoothing can typically mean that the domestic price may not 
communicate the right signals emanating from the world price
33. However, given the 
long-term nature of coffee investment (3-5 yr. tree maturity) and the volatile or 
reactionary nature of market signals, short term smoothing may not negatively impact 
overall sound decision-making. Indeed, there may have been considerable benefit in 
having consistent signals and a consistent policy.  
 
This price guarantee has helped to ensure that producers receive close to market prices 
from all buyers
34. It should be noted that the system functioned for decades but when it 
recently broke down, growers were left without the capacity to manage price volatility 
and hedge risks. The question is often asked about whether the government should 
intervene directly in coffee or should its involvement in the coffee sector be similar to 
that in any other sector. It has been pointed out that other export sectors such as 
flowers and bananas have faced dramatic price fluctuations and real exchange 
appreciation and shown a significant capacity to respond without government subsidies. 
While this is certainly true and presents a valid point, it should be noted that these other 
sectors are also more concentrated and manageable than coffee. 
 
The decision to transfer the full world price to growers is consistent with a vision that 
assumes they are mature enough to take the best decisions that maximize their well-
being. Of course, this does not preclude the possibility of the 'contribución' tax. Of 
course, such taxation can only be considered fair when: it is a decision that is freely 
taken by the growers themselves; they are able to understand exactly what their tax is 
being used for; and how efficiently their money is being spent can be transparently 
determined. It is also important that the benefits of the sector’s public taxation be first 
                                                 
32 This government appointed commission had access to a previous version of this document (The Colombia Coffee 
Policy Note).  It released its independent recommendations, “El Café, Capital Social y Estratégico” as this document 
was being finalized. 
33 It must be said that Colombia’s production has nevertheless appeared more responsive to the crisis than a number 
of other producing countries whose output did not decline markedly. 
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and foremost oriented to the provision of essential public goods, such as research and 
technical assistance.   
 
Business does not thrive if the tax rate levied on it is subject to constant change. In the 
case of coffee, its tax has historically changed in a discretionary and untransparent 
manner. Any tax must be reasonably low and clearly defined so that economic agents 
(coffee producers, commercial agents, exporters) can define long term strategies as 
well as new investment plans. 
 
The CAIC report notes that historically both the coffee tax and the internal price have 
been subjected to manipulations that have produced distortions and inefficiencies. The 
absence of defined parameters for setting these prices have led to a possibly excessive 
retention of money by the FNC to the detriment of growers’ income. 
 
The 170 page draft report further notes that the government's role and participation (as 
a member of the managing National Coffee Committee) in setting internal prices and the 
coffee tax were occasionally  influenced by macroeconomic policy goals and political 
priorities rather than the direct benefit of the coffee growers. Through the FNC coffee 
growers have contributed an estimated $535 million to the national government in the 
last 17 years. 
 
The NFCG's role as buyer of last resort has been hotly debated for its potential to distort 
the market. Nevertheless, there is evidence, in the presence of a steadily concentrating 
market that is characterized by some as oligopsonic (see chart), that this has provided a 
larger share of the market price to producers than might otherwise have occurred. It 
remains unclear how efficient this service has been. International evidence on the 
theme is mixed. The growers in at least two other major Latin American producers 
(Brazil and Guatemala) receive a similar or even higher percentage of the export price 
in the absence of institutional price setting. In the 1990s Colombia received a higher 
average world price than its closest competitors in Central America although 
Guatemala, with its higher percentage of large farmers, has since overtaken it. 
Colombia has traditionally also passed along a relatively high percentage of the export 
price to its producers. Colombian farmers receive a higher percentage than the majority 
of other Latin American and world producers with a ten-year average of approximately 
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Chart 9.    5 leading exporters as% of total coffee exports 
 
Source: NFCG from CAIC report 2002 
 
It is not clear whether Colombia’s highly regulated coffee marketing scheme is efficient 
or burdensome for the participants. For example, in principle, the NFCG and private 
exporters compete for available coffee but in practice, there appears to be an implicit 
quota. The mechanism for fixing a premium on Colombian coffee was not transparent 
and when fixed above the world market, exporters’ competitiveness was affected. 
Varying the opening and closing dates for sales precluded the possibility of fixing long 
term contracts. These administrative measures may have inhibited the development of 
attractive investment possibilities in Colombia’s coffee sector.   
     
These measures highlight the problematic dual role of the NFCG as a regulatory agency 
and as a market participant  handling 35% of exports. The CAIC confirms that even the 
administration and accounting functions for the primary and distinct roles of producer 
income stabilization and provision of public services have been mixed together. The 
resulting lack of transparency makes it nearly impossible to appropriately monitor or 
evaluate performance and difficult to control political manipulation. Any inefficiencies 
and excessive costs have ultimately been paid by the grower who is powerless to make 
an informed choice when this information is not transparent and readily available. 
 
To be financially and institutionally viable the CAIC insists that the coffee institutions be 
significantly restructured in order to effectively fulfill their three essential functions: 
commercialization, provision of public services, and price stabilization. As such, a 
complete restructuring of administration, management, and accounting will be 
necessary in order to provide the essential transparency to evaluate and manage its 
functions in a more responsible and businesslike manner.  
 
It is not only an internal restructuring or normative dispositions that will help establish an 
effective new institutional framework. A new framework must be the result of the 
construction of a relationship and cooperative programs with the main actors in the   59
sector, civil society groups, commodity-based organizations (gremio), the private sector, 
local governments, and communities that represent local interests. 
  
Research and development 
 
CENICAFE is known as one of the world’s leading coffee research institutions for its 
important agronomic achievements and its technical capacity. Its efforts have produced 
numerous breakthroughs in coffee technology. "Variedad Colombia", an advanced 
strain of the coffee plant that is more resistant to leaf rust disease was developed by 
CENICAFE. Its elite status is due, in part, to decades of investment in its research 
capabilities. Unfortunately it too lacks adequate monitoring and evaluation systems to 
properly determine its efficiency and the impartial application of its resources. The CAIC 
notes that CENICAFE has an accumulated inventory of basic research and production 
technology that could greatly benefit the coffee sector on the whole, especially 
smallholders, but it has been more focused on the high-tech and larger scale 
developments. Without appropriate evaluation and feedback mechanisms it will be 
difficult for this Center to be more responsive to its clientele, particularly smallholders.  
 
CENICAFE can potentially be even more useful and sustainable by linking with other 
international institutions and selling services to all interested buyers, within and outside 
of Colombia, as a way to finance its R&D programs. In this way it can pursue the 
successful pattern of development demonstrated by leading international crop research 
centers such as The International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT)  or the 
International Potato Center (CIP) also in the region. Among the services it could offer is 
the certification of growing processes and/or origin. This would facilitate Colombia's 
move toward differentiated products and lend a unique credibility that  many countries 
may not have. 
 
National Sectorial Leadership 
 
Its detractors have accused the leading coffee institutions of being inefficient, feudal 
fiefdoms and even of being mismanaged
35. While they may not be perfect, they have 
nonetheless fulfilled some very valuable roles. Indeed, many analysts would agree that 
despite its shortcomings the NFCG is the most successful coffee sector institution in the 
world and that much of Colombia's coffee success is due to its coordinated and 
cohesive policy and its m arketing investments. It remains to be seen whether its 
functions and roles will be redesigned to be more transparent and facilitate its periodic 
evaluation in order to ensure that it can provide the best and most representative 
service for its constituents. Doing away with the Federation altogether - as some have 
suggested - is a drastic step whose consequences must be very carefully considered. 
Rather than ‘throwing out the baby with the bath water’, it may be more useful to help it 
become a leaner and better institution. 
 
At present the resource allocation system divides funds to each department according 
to its percentage participation of total national coffee production, as established 
according to historical measurements (Encuesta Nacional Cafetera). T he current 
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method  does not differentiate between social needs of the population and coffee 
production needs, even though part of those resources are meant to solve social needs 
of the coffee growing population and it does not necessary follow that the most 
productive regions have the greatest social needs. From the point of view of coffee 
production this can have a regressive effect because it does not reflect the dynamic 
behavior of certain regions in terms of coffee production. More frequent revisions of the 
allocation system would help it to better recognize and respond to these continuous 
changes. 
 
There is of course the question of how much social work the NFCG ought to carry out. 
Despite its well-regarded record in this area, the CAIC report suggests that it should be 
limited to extension services, research, and international promotion of Colombian 
coffee. 
 
The NFCG of the future will likely be leaner and more agile. It will have to adopt new 
technology faster and be more transparent for its stakeholders. Regardless of the roles 
that the NFCG  evolves toward, it could be evaluated in a number of ways among which 
should be its capability to:  
 
1.  transmit the maximum economic value to the producer  
2.  efficiently add value  
3.  distribute the value equitably 
4.  improve productivity and reduce transaction costs 
5.  transparently and legitimately represent its constituents 
6.  strategically improve the sector's competitiveness 
 
Local and Regional Institutions  
 
Apart from coffee’s relevance with respect to being the main cash crop for at least 
423,000 rural households in Colombia, the present crisis is bound to affect rural coffee-
growing areas in general. The effect will be not only be felt in income reduction and the 
slowdown of economic activity, but also as the institutional void where the NFCG’s local 
and regional organizations cease to benefit the population of the coffee growing areas 
in a significant way. 
 
The Departmental Coffee Committees (DCCs) are the regional branches of the NFCG. 
They have a managing board made u p of elected members of the coffee growing 
community and their job is to invest their budget in the social and economic 
development of their coffee growing areas. This budget is allocated according to each 
department’s share in national coffee production. They are also responsible for carrying 
out extension services for coffee production. The DCCs’ local representatives are the 
Municipal Coffee Committees (MCCs), which are made up of elected members of the 
local coffee community; their job is exclusively to channel local needs to the DCC level 
where decisions as to resource allocation are taken. 
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DCCs  invested in the development of rural infrastructure including water supply 
systems, road building and repair, education infrastructure and electricity networks. 
They also implemented various other programs such as health care and home 
improvement programs, special education campaigns, and extension services in coffee 
production. Even though municipalities have taken over the bulk of these social services 
over the last decade, some were still fulfilled by the DCCs. A case in point is the World 
Bank-Ministry of Education’s project for improving quality in rural education, where the 
DCCs are the local implementing agency in the coffee growing areas 
 
The DCCs and MCCs in the different coffee growing areas developed as institutions 
highly dependent on the NFCG and their efficiency and power inhibited alternative 
regional organizations. Now that these rural systems have lost financial power and 
influence to carry out t heir important civic tasks, there are no institutional alternatives 
that can readily replace them. 
 
Up until 1991, when the New Constitution mandated decentralization, the DCCs’ 
investment in coffee growing areas was quite significant. However, from there onwards 
their impact has greatly diminished due to the increasing importance of local 
administrations and now the coffee crisis. Even their most basic function of extension 
services will be funded entirely by the central government in 2002 but probably not to 
the same levels as before. 
 
According to a 1997 study
36, in 1980 the municipal governments of the coffee growing 
areas invested approximately 0.10% of GDP, while DCCs’ investment in that same year 
was about 0.14% of GDP. By 1997 the municipal governments’ investment grew 
threefold while DCC's remained static. By 2002 DCC's investments have essentially 
disappeared. In the face of the coffee crisis and the increased importance of local 
administrations as rural development agents, the question is raised of whether there is a 
realistic and sustainable role left for DCCs to play in coffee growing areas?  
 
This type of local organization offers many advantages which allow it to deliver 
efficiently and effectively many social goods like no other organization public or private 
in Colombia’s rural sector is capable. DCCs have developed a network of unique 
community organizations which allow for efficient delivery of diverse types of programs 
for the benefit of rural populations. DCCs have also developed an expertise in project 
implementation and management that is rarely found in rural areas; this is especially 
advantageous for local administrations which lack this capability. When funding for 
DCCs ceases altogether they will be forced to sell their services as engineering 
contractors, extension agents, consultants, and community organizers. This could be 
put to good use channeling both private and public, national and international 
resources. 
 
A case example that illustrates one of the potentially useful new roles for DCCs was 
noted in a recent governmental evaluation (DNP, 2001) of the effectiveness of ‘Familias 
en Acción’, a program designed to provide income support for poor families. It 
concluded that its primary constraint was the difficulty in reaching poor rural families and 
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the lack of an organizational network for its effective implementation. The DCC's could 
potentially provide that network. 
 
Rather than focusing exclusively on the apex organizations like the NFCG, government 
policy can also broadly promote more localized organizations of producers. Once these 
are recognized as legal entities and can be held responsible by their constituents they 
can have a positive effect by empowering local communities to better handle their own 
development issues. Providing support for institutional capacity building is critical in 
order for these organizations to manage their affairs, democratically represent their 
constituents, and develop adequate commercial skills. The now more independent 
cooperative structure that was formerly part of the NFCG is a good example of this 
decentralized empowerment while still maintaining useful ties with the NFCG.  
 
9.  Financing and Credit: the unsolved crisis  
 
For many decades the issue of credit has been a priority for producers. In 1930 they 
helped to create the Agricultural Savings Bank (Caja Agraria) and in 1953 the Coffee 
Bank (Banco Cafetero). Despite the overall historic success of coffee private financial 
institutions are not disposed to extending credit in rural areas and to small producers. 
This situation is common to rural areas in all developing countries due primarily to three 
reasons:  
 
1.  the inability of these often urban-based financial institutions to adequately 
understand and manage the needs of small farmers  
2.  the high-risk and limited security of collateral (i.e. rural land) 
3.  the inordinately high-cost of managing numerous small credit lines 
 
Both public and private financial institutions to support the coffee sector have 
undergone dramatic changes in the past decade that h ave significantly reduced the 
number of outlets and the availability of credit.  This appears to be more pronounced in 
rural areas and can be measured in the contraction of credit flows to agriculture from 
banks.  This declined approximately 16% between 1998 and 2001.  In real terms small 
farmers have seen a drastic double-digit annual decline in formal credit over the last five 
years that amounts to approximately a 60% reduction overall (Brizzi, Gomez & 
McMahon, 2002). The 1999 dissolution of the Caja Agraria to help correct the 
distortions in the world financial markets has unfortunately left little effective public 
management of rural finance in its wake. Finagro was created by the government to 
help resolve some of these problems and to help channel credit to the agrarian sector. 
A Guarantee Fund with Banco Agrario that was set up in 2001 was also designed to 
help producers secure and manage their credit needs. 
 
Nevertheless, the considerable shifts in the private financial sector leave a credit 
vacuum and make it increasingly difficult to overcome the high transaction costs of rural 
lending. This is further complicated by Colombia's rural violence that impedes the 
functioning of public institutions and deters private-sector involvement. As a result it is 
all the more important to support institutional arrangements that facilitate informal credit   63
transactions. A responsive regulatory structure, provision of incentives and technical 
assistance for intermediary capacity such as training in credit management a nd 
improved financial systems and services will facilitate the flow of credit from informal 
sources such as producer organizations, traders and trade associations, input suppliers 
and processing facilities. Brizzi, Gomez & McMahon (2002) point out that informal credit 
is already very important according to two studies in 1997 and 1999 showing that while 
only 15% of rural households received credit, fully one-third of these relied on informal 
channels. Rebuilding these informal channels so that they can mobilize savings and 
develop financial products such as insurance, investment funds, and credit information 
systems is a necessary first step toward the eventual rebuilding of more formal financial 
systems. 
 
With the decrease in world coffee prices during the 1990s, most coffee producers had to 
undergo numerous credit restructurings. This has created a complex set of problems 
not only for Colombia but for many other coffee producing countries as well.   
 
Banks and other rural financial institutions are not willing to extend new credit to coffee 
sector as long as prices remain depressed and the sector does not clear its old 
(restructured) debts. Restructuring may also demoralize good debtors. The formal 
financial sector does not have an adequate risk model to evaluate credit worthiness in 
the agricultural sector, including difficulties in forecasting coffee prices and that, as well 
as other sources of market failure, has made it shun the sector. Agricultural producers 
have turned to informal credit sources such as suppliers of agricultural inputs or 
entrepreneurial opportunists with their correspondingly higher rates of interest.  
 
Recent studies have identified the problem as market failure due mainly to asymmetry 
in information, lack of adequate guarantees, and perceived low internal rates of return 
that make agricultural projects financially unattractive (Marulanda Consultores, 2001). 
Rural security problems are an aggravating issue. It is vital to provide training on the 
distinct vagaries of agricultural financing (i.e. seasonality) and it would be helpful to 
develop appropriate coverage mechanisms which separate market risks (output, prices, 
and quality) from financial risks (rates of interest, liquidity, and rate of exchange). 
Stimulating the financial sector’s interest in agricultural projects may also initially require 
additional incentives.  
 
The unsolved market failure of the rural credit system has reduced the availability and 
impact of formal financial services in rural areas. The extent to which farmers a re 
turning to informal credit sources or even the amount of farmer’s savings is unknown. 
Currently the Word Bank is preparing for an extensive survey of supply and demand for 
rural credit services. These studies intended to provide a comprehensive picture of the 
different financial services and finance systems available in rural areas, their 
geographical distribution, and the structure of the demand for them.  
 
Experiences derived from the Productive Alliances Project (Marulanda Consultores 
2000), provide s ome indications as to what can be gained, in terms of financing 
investment in agricultural production from joint ventures between organized producers 
and agents along the chain of commercialization. Producers benefit from the alliance by 
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supply. Once this sort of scheme is effective its overall rate of return increases making it 
more attractive for potential financial investors. Although this is not a solution for the 
entire sector, some coffee producers can benefit from these sorts of alliances and 
private Colombian exporters have already manifested an interest in developing such 
joint ventures.  
 
10.  Risk management and safety nets 
 
Price Risk Management 
 
For the purpose of this document we take a very basic definition of Coffee Price Risk 
Management in Colombia as the utilization of either local mechanisms or international 
financial instruments in order to reduce price risk. In this regard, substantial changes 
occurred within the country’s coffee policy after 1999 and particularly during 2001. To 
better understand the situation it is worth noting that the sectoral participants can be 
divided into five categories: 
 
1.  Farmers 
2.  Co-operatives 
3.  Private Exporters 
4.  NFCG, acting as an exporter of the coffee purchased with resources from the 
FNC  
5.  The FNC, acting as a stabilization entity 
 
Farmers: Coffee farmers in Colombia have always enjoyed the benefit of a price floor 
given to them by The FNC. Ever since 1940, a tax, namely the “contribución”, was 
levied on them as a means to support coffee institutions and programs. Since 
November 1997, the tax structure was such that at low international prices it only 
accounted for institutional costs, but as prices rose, it also replenished The FNC 
foreseeing periods of minimum price guarantee. 
 
At that time, NFCG determined its purchasing price and conveyed this to all participants 
in the market. The resulting price then became the benchmark against which any other 
exporter had to compete in order to buy coffee in the domestic market. 
 
The floor mechanism operated as follows: if the NFCG price formula resulted in a price 
that was below the floor, The NFCG would offer to buy coffee at the floor price, 
otherwise it would pay the price obtained from the formula. The formula was based on 
the theoretical price that an exporter paid in the internal market, if his main sources of 
income were determined by the NYBOT coffee futures first delivery month, plus a 
Colombian coffee premium, minus a certain number o f costs incurred in the export 
process. The floor level set by the National Coffee Committee was based on the 
assumption that it would be the minimum income level that would meet coffee farmers’ 
needs. The FNC’s rapidly deteriorating financial structure during 1999-2000, forced it to 
abandon the floor mechanism in January of 2001. 
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Today, The NFCG’s price is no longer the result of a formula and farmers are fully 
exposed to the NYBOT price volatility. 
 
Co-operatives: There are 40 co-operatives that act as The NFCG’s coffee purchasing 
agents. They function based on a network of 500 purchasing points spread throughout 
the country, in which they can pay cash to any farmer that wishes to sell export-quality 
coffee. The money to purchase the coffee belongs to The FNC, but is managed by The 
NFCG. 
 
Up until 2001, co-operatives enjoyed the benefit of an arbitrage opportunity at the 
moment of selling to The NFCG, coffees previously purchased from coffee growers. 
This opportunity can also be characterized as a “free Put” that was given to them by 
The NFCG through the set internal price formula. 
 
Private Exporters: This group represents nearly 70% of Colombia's total export volume. 
They are well accustomed to the use of local and international financial instruments in 
order to manage their price risk. Some of them like to have small speculative positions 
in futures and options in their portfolios and some others simply speculate in the 
physical coffee bought in the internal market. Up until 2001, Private Exporters also 
enjoyed the benefit of an arbitrage opportunity at the moment of fixing a tax payment to 
The FNC. They collected this tax from farmers via a price discount. This opportunity 
was the result of a formula used to calculate the tax. 
 
The NFCG: This participant,  with more than 30% of the country’s exports, is the most 
important player in the internal market and has the additional responsibility, as opposed 
to any other exporter, of honoring a purchase guarantee to any farmer who wishes to 
sell export-quality coffee. The NFCG introduced a separate Risk Management Division 
(RMD) in 1999 with the objective of identifying, measuring, and if possible, hedging all 
price risk exposures for it and the FNC.  
 
At that time, the main sources of risk were: 
 
a)  Commercial Risk: This risk rises from the time spanning between a coffee 
purchase and a sale, given that both prices are based on the NYBOT price 
and Foreign Exchange rate (and are hence exposed to their volatilities).  
b)  Inventory Risk: Apart from the “commercial inventory”,  The FNC held a 
significant volume amount of non-hedged past and old crop coffees. 
c)  Price Floor Risk: The risk rising from the floor price given to farmers. 
d)  Arbitrage Risk: The risk rising from the opportunities given to Co-operatives, 
The FNC’s clients in the international markets and Private Exporters. 
 
The work and recommendations made by the RMD, along with the efforts made by the 
Commercial Manager’s office, served as the basis for a blueprint describing substantial 
company-wide changes The NFCG was to introduce. Today, the status of the above 
mentioned risks is as follows: 
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a)  Commercial Risk: The NFCG hedges all the coffee bought for commercial 
purposes. 
b)  Inventory Risk: The inventory of past and old crop coffees has been reduced 
to the lowest level in the last twenty years yet remains un-hedged. 
c)  Price Floor Risk: Eliminated in January 2001. 
d)  Arbitrage Risk: Eliminated during 2001. 
 
The FNC:  The FNC's primary goal at its inception was to smooth of the flow of coffee 
supplied by managing considerable inventories of green coffee. This function ceased in 
1989. Meanwhile another of the FNC's primary goals over nearly three decades has 
been to provide a price stabilization mechanism. It fulfilled that function reasonably well 
until it's reduced assets in the late 1990s were unable to bridge the necessary gaps 
created by the price crisis. It abandoned price stabilization in January 2001.  
 
Given the financial constraints currently faced by The FNC, its function as a stabilization 
mechanism has evolved into one that provides a fair price to coffee growers on a daily 
basis, while maintaining a purchasing guarantee. Of course farmers are now fully 
exposed to external price volatility. 
 
Other Risks   
 
The local market is faced with other type of risks covered here briefly: 
 
1.  Differential Risk:  The coffee commercialization price is based on a futures price 
and a Colombian coffee premium (differential). Since domestic coffee purchasing and 
sales takes place at different moments in time, the values of its price differentials may 
differ. 
 
The futures price risk may be efficiently hedged by trading futures or futures options 
referring to the New York CSCE ‘C’ contract. Colombian coffee’s differential variations 
are influenced by fundamental variables of the supply-demand relation for Colombian 
coffee and its substitute origins. There is a lack of financial instruments suited to hedge 
the Colombian coffee premium risk and in order to protect themselves, exporters must 
allow for provisions that will allow them to still be viable when their purchasing price is 
above market levels and/or when sales differentials are below purchasing price levels. 
 
2.  Foreign Exchange Risk:  Coffee purchasing and sales involve different 
currencies, exposing market participants to foreign exchange risk. In Colombia’s 
particular case, coffee is bought in Colombian Pesos and it may be sold abroad in US 
Dollars and other currencies. The foreign exchange risk results due to the time lag 
between the coffee purchases and the conversion of the invoices into Colombian pesos.   
 
Exporters, especially in harvest, require large cash flows for accumulating inventories. 
They may face the need to pre-finance their activity, and they can do it in several ways: 
converting their invoices income to Colombian Pesos, foreign currency credit and/or 
local currency credit.    67
 
In order to guarantee predictable cash flows, which are a primary objective of hedging 
activities, Colombian coffee exporters typically use foreign exchange forward contracts 
and options. 
 
3.  Costs Risk:  Exporters have the possibility of buying parchment coffee or green 
beans. When buying green beans, they can efficiently hedge their price risk using the 
NYBOT's ‘C’ contract. 
 
When buying parchment coffee, even though the ‘C’ contract can be used for hedging, 
its efficiency decreases due to the need for transformation before the export takes 
place. Exporters therefore are exposed to the risk of obtaining higher processing costs 
that those implicitly discounted for calculating the purchasing price. 
 
4.  Country Risk:  Guerrilla violence has begun to destabilize coffee growers’ 
livelihoods. Traditionally, the coffee region was immune to this kind of problem, but the 
collapse in prices has taken a toll on farmers’ income, forcing farmers to seek 
alternatives, sometimes in illicit employment, and to abandon their coffee plantations 
thus reducing safety in coffee regions. Guerillas have a strong presence on major 
roads, and are stealing or destroying coffee trucks. At the very least they make it difficult 
and more costly  to transport coffee through those routes. Additionally, at times illegal 
funds are "laundered"  by buying coffee, thereby artificially raising prices to levels at 
which legitimate exporters become non-competitive.  
 
5.  Agricultural Yield Risk:  The risk of losses generated by a lower than expected 
coffee volume or quality. It is faced primarily by farmers and by those market 
participants that transform parchment coffee into green exportable beans.  
 
6.  Credit Risk:  It is faced by several market participants. The Private Exporters 
face it when they give money in advance to intermediaries, in order to buy coffee on 
their behalf. The FNC faces it when the coops do not fulfill their obligation to deliver the 
coffee they have bought with the FNC’s financial resources and also fail to return the 
money. The FNC also faces credit risk with the growers, when buying coffee for future 
delivery. In this case, the FNC pays for at least part of the coffee in advance, and it is 
exposed to the default risk if the growers do not comply with their obligation.   
 
7.  Regulatory Risk:  It is faced by several market participants. It is the risk of 
generating losses due to sudden changes in the national coffee policy, usually in the 
amount of the quasi-tax to be paid. Since the tax is paid when the coffee is exported, 
the FNC and the private exporters face the risk of collecting from the growers a smaller 
amount than the one they should pay. This is a result of the time lag between the 
purchase of the coffee and its export.    
 
8.  Logistics Risk:  The risk of losses, faced across the whole supply-chain, due to 
problems in the logistics process, which include the transportation, storage, and 
transformation of the coffee.    
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With the elimination of the floor price mechanism offered by FNC in January 2001, small 
coffee farmers in Colombia have no access to formal instruments to deal with price 
risks. There are several informal instruments that farmers can use to reduce their 
overall risks. Farmers can: 
 
§ Diversify to include other crops in addition to coffee 
§ Diversify their labor by working outside their farm or non-farm employment 
§ Adapt their technology (i.e. using fewer inputs) 
 
Safety Nets 
In many coffee growing areas coffee’s dominance means that price risk has a systemic 
effect on the overall rural economy and all economic activities, including non-farm 
activities, slow down. Thus, many people see migration to urban areas or even abroad 
as a solution. Social protection programs would need to target the vulnerable groups 
within rural communities t hat may not only include small, poor, farmers but also 
displaced people, the elderly, many indigenous peoples, and landless workers who 
because of low coffee prices cannot find employment on coffee farms.  
 
Improvements in productivity and training in basic skills can be usefully targeted too 
many of these people who may be very dependent on low-productivity agriculture as 
their primary source of income. Permit culture and organic agriculture methods can do 
particularly useful to improve food security.  
 
To support producers in periods of very low prices it is preferable to rely more on 
income transfer payments, such as those used in Mexico and Nicaragua, instead of 
price support. Income transfers have the advantage of being less distortionary in terms 
of incentives, compared to price support programs. Price support prevents necessary 
adjustments in production patterns. Price support programs may also prove to be 
costlier compared to income support, but income support programs may be more 
difficult to administer as they require information about the individual farmers (plot size, 
location, etc.). If prices rise, the FNC could be replenished and serve to provide a 
modified form of price stabilization using the markets- a sort of premium farmers pay for 
insurance - so long as it allows market/price signals to reach the producers. 
 
The FNC, now no longer able to provide stability, rightly claims that it provides a fair 
price and maintains a purchasing guarantee. This is true although an information 
system might also provide a reasonable ‘fair price’ assurance at a much lower cost and 
there appears to already be an ample market to sell quality Colombian coffee. Of 
course, the FNC’s role would be much harder to replace in remote, less contested 
markets where cooperatives and associations would have to intervene. A reasonable 
investigation or pilot study could test these alternatives. 
 
Private exporters, now accounting for 65% of coffee exports, and the NFCG are very 
familiar with the types of financial instruments to hedge their price exposure. Currently, 
use of risk management instruments is primarily limited to their own short-term price 
exposure - from the moment they buy coffee from farmers to the moment they sell it -   69
and benefits farmers very little. It may be useful to facilitate both the understanding and 
access of sound smallholder organizations and associations to risk management 
instruments, such as options traded at NYBOT that may offer at times an attractive 
solution to reduce their exposure. 
 
Farmers also  need to reduce their price uncertainty when they make their short-term 
investments and receive working capital loans. Because of their relatively small 
production size in general, coffee farmers need appropriate institutions that would 
aggregate enough volume of production and hedge it in the international market. 
Farmer cooperatives and producer associations, are amongst some of the institutional 
structures that farmers can use to access price risk management instruments. It would 
be valuable to support The Risk Management Dept. of the NFCG  or other agencies 
such as The World Bank who, in partnership with other international organizations and 
the private sector, has initiated a project to enable groups of farmers to access price risk 
management instruments.      
 
While debt restructuring in the credit arena will be important in settling old debt there are 
certain things to bear in mind. Debt forgiveness and write-offs provide disincentives for 
prudent risk management and thus, they need to be discouraged. New credits need to 
be accompanied by appropriate risk management instruments, much like the example 
of US bank loans to farmers.  The provision of guarantees by the public sector could be 
problematic.  Public guarantees are a poor bandage since they may encourage less due 
diligence by private financial institutions, and they may prove to become a financial 
burden for the government.  Public guarantees without appropriate systems to screen 
loans and ensuring that appropriate risk management systems are in place will likely not 
work.   
 




The main macro variable affecting coffee production in the medium term is the real 
exchange rate (RER).  The real appreciation of the RER negatively affects coffee and 
other export goods. In the case of coffee production, as it is labor intensive (more than 
70% of costs are labor costs), and labor is a non-tradable factor of production, its 
profitability is extremely sensitive to the RER level. During the 1990s the Colombian 
peso appreciated more than 30% in value against the dollar. The difference contributed 
to approximately 2 billion dollars in comparative income losses for the FNC during the 
decade.   
 
A number of studies (Montenegro 1997;  Cárdenas 1997) have cited that public 
expenditure was the primary cause of this appreciation. As with any other export sector, 
macroeconomic stability and a competitive exchange rate are critical factors for the 
sector’s long-term planning. Echavarría (2002, p. 6) notes that the RER is a variable 
that may not always be easily controlled by government and “export dynamism has to 
originate in many other sources, like productivity, to be sustainable”. In the case of 
coffee production it means that a way to offset the pernicious effects of appreciation on 
its profitability is to increase physical productivity while at the same time keeping costs   70
under control, or alternatively, keeping similar levels of productivity but reducing costs.  
Providing a highly competitive product through differentiation strategies which a dd 
market value to the product and may be negotiated in foreign currencies can also be 




In the past, there have been several attempts to stabilize the world coffee prices 
through the International Coffee Agreement (ICA). The ICA succeeded in keeping 
coffee prices higher and stable although price stabilization benefited mostly exporting 
countries with established higher quotas and penalized new dynamic entrants (Akiyama 
and Varangis, 1 990).  Since 1989, the ICA does not include economic clauses that 
would regulate the coffee market resulting in greater world price volatility and overall 
lower prices during the 1990s.  From 1993 until its recent demise a producers’ cartel, 
the Association of Coffee Producing Countries (ACPC) tried but failed to regulate the 
world coffee supply through a retention scheme.  
 
In addition to international efforts, several coffee producing countries (including 
Colombia, PNG, Cote d’Ivoire and Cameroon) have independently used price 
stabilization funds. Almost all of these stabilization funds have run into serious financial 
difficulties. In most cases the funds eventually went bankrupt. While it lasted, 
Colombia's was certainly the most successful, although its  net worth has dramatically 
decreased and it can no longer perform its stabilization function. During the 1990s, 
several coffee producing countries tried to support domestic prices through customized 
funds or the issuance of bonds (i.e. Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador)
37.  Nicaragua 
and Mexico used funds differently to support the income of small coffee producers by 
giving a fixed payment per hectare, with a cap on maximum farm size, rather than by 
production quantity.  More recently Guatemala is using a fund to promote diversification, 
agro-processing, marketing, and debt restructuring.  The various experiences with price 
support schemes and stabilization funds provide us with the following lessons: 
 
1.  Most price stabilization schemes aim to support domestic prices when world 
prices decline.  The objective of higher prices rather than stable prices is almost 
impossible to maintain (Deaton, 1992; McIntire & Varangis, 1998). 
 
2.  If support is deemed absolutely necessary, the better approach is to support the 
income and/or the diversification of coffee farmers instead of supporting prices.  
Mexico and Nicaragua, for example have provided a support linked to amount of 
ha. under coffee so that there is less distortionary incentive to increase 
production in order to receive more.   
 
3.  Any price support scheme that maintains a higher price level removes the 
realistic incentives for necessary adjustments in terms of diversification and 
reducing production in marginal areas.    
 
                                                 
37 Costa Rica’s Costa Rica National Fund for Coffee Stabilization (FONECAFE) paid farmers $6.38/qq during 1998-
99, 1999-2000, and $18.76/qq during 2000-01 with the obligation of a repayment by farmers if world prices increase 
above $92/qq. Similar efforts by  Guatemala and El Salvador were all funded through the issuance of bonds.   71
For a number of years domestic policies in the Colombian coffee sector have aimed at 
stabilizing coffee prices through a floor price mechanism to farmers from the FNC.  For 
more than two decades of the FNC has met its goal as a price stabilization scheme, as 
evidenced by the fact that the internal price volatility has been half that of the world 
coffee price volatility as measured by the coffee futures index.  
 
Chart 10.  Stabilization and accumulation by the FNC    
 
 
However, coffee price stabilization has come at a cost that at times of low world prices 
has been significant. The precarious financial condition of the FNC rapidly deteriorated 
after 1999
38 in part as a result of low prices that eliminated much of its special coffee tax 
revenue and eventually the floor price m echanism was abandoned in January 2001. 
This meant few resources left for the implementation of coffee policy, so the Colombian 
government came to the rescue with a support package (see Annex I) and the FNC 
secured a credit line from the banks in order to  continue the FNC’s most basic 
functions. 
 
The package is based on the assumption that world prices will recover to reasonable 
levels in around three years and this assumption carries some risk.  Should the 
expected price scenario not occur, the sector would be left with an unsustainable supply 
structure, which would have been created with public incentives. Furthermore, while 
there is an official warning that the subsidy scheme has a limited time horizon, it may 
turn out to be politically difficult to remove should market conditions not improve as 
expected. 
                                                 
38 Most of NCF’s accumulated assets including the bank, the financial corporations, shipping company and others 
were lost. 




The possibility of setting up a permanent coffee tax contribution in Colombia has been 
proposed as a solution.  One option is for this contribution level to vary according to 
world coffee prices t hus enabling savings during high price periods that would be 
employed to support production during low price periods. While the tax itself would be a 
feasible way of maintaining the cohesiveness of the sector's most useful strategies such 
as research and marketing, its usefulness for stabilization purposes may be limited and 
it presents at least two problems: First, the uncertainty generated by a tax which varies 
over time may discourage investment in the sector and second, the difficulty in 
determining the long term equilibrium price in order to fix the levels for the variable tax.  
 
In December of 2001 the FNC proposed a flat tax of 5 cents per pound to maintain the 
NFCG's priority programs in the research, extension, and promotion and this may be 
one of t he best solutions especially when combined with an option for a vote of the 
producers on special assessments in boom years to fund specific projects or initiatives. 
 
For the year 2002, the amount of “contribución cafetera” varies according to the level of 
the Colombian FOB sale price., following the structure described in the graphic below. 
As of April 2002, the tax was US$.006/lb, taking as a reference the current price of 
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Subsidies 
 
At present subsidies which affect coffee production are: A) a subsidy for the renovation 
of coffee plantations and B) a price subsidy for coffee guaranteeing the farmer a 
minimum price support for his coffee production. Planting of new stock has been 
subsidized by the government at US$.05 each tree, representing about 15% of the total 
upgrade costs on a hectare planting basis. Presently the government has been 
subsidizing the coffee price paid to the farmer at US$.11 (Col $240) per kg of dried 
coffee as long as the corresponding internal coffee price, according to coffee world price 
minus commercialization costs, remains below US$1.16 (Col$2,544) per kg of dried 
coffee. That reflects an export price of about US$1.54 kg
39. 
 
These subsidies are a public benefits whose formal intention is primarily to provide a 
safety net insuring the long-term health of the sector and to prevent some of the less 
able participants, who have few alternatives, from slipping into poverty. It is therefore 
worth examining some of the questions  raised about the potential consequences of 
these subsidies. 
 
Renovation is a necessary component of a competitive coffee sector and must be part 
of any long-term strategy. Since coffee tree renovation is a customary production 
practice that larger producers typically carry out in order to remain profitable, regardless 
of subsidies, the fact that they are as eligible for the subsidy as every one else, blunts 
the desired effect of supporting the poorest small producers who might otherwise be 
less able to maintain their production capacity, and turns it into a regressive instrument.  
 
It has been noted that widespread renovation subsidies may induce decisions in coffee 
farmers resulting in supply capacities that do not correspond to the actual demand of 
world coffee markets. The logic behind renovation subsidies is to preserve and maintain 
a coffee plant stock which corresponds to desirable productivity levels. The NFCG 
estimates that these renovations will enable farmers to maintain an average annual 
output of approximately 12 million bags (it's a recent historic average) while doing so on 
considerably less acreage. This renovation will help to remove approximately 180,000 
hectares of marginal, underproductive, and high-cost areas from coffee production. 
 
Price-oriented subsidies such as the one in place also isolate producer’s decisions from 
actual market conditions, thus distorting production capacity. Its most pernicious aspect 
is the political difficulties encountered when trying to stop or modify it that can result in 
making it a quasi- permanent subsidy. 
 
The policy instruments of price and renovation subsidies may work against coffee 
growers’ initiative to procure more sustainable and realistic productive structures on 
their farms, i.e. diversification initiatives within coffee or out of it that might secure better 
overall profitability for their farms. 
 
Among the alternatives to higher production levels is to support more sustainable 
production. CENICAFE has already researched and published on organic and 
environmentally friendly production. Some of these alternatives although less productive 
                                                 
39 At an exchange rate of US$1 to COL$ 2300.   74
in terms of output volume, might be less risky due to fewer labor and input costs and 
therefore potentially more profitable, and environmentally more advantageous. 
 
  -  Future Options 
 
Despite the complexity of the issues there are clear messages to be taken into account. 
 
The options presented are of a long term and multi-sectoral nature and new strategies 
will have to take this into account. The options of risk management, market 
differentiation, diversification, managing marketing alliances are all knowledge intensive 
in which new knowledge has to be generated, transferred and internalized in the 
production, processing and marketing chain. In rural areas this implies i ncreased 
access to basic education and training as well as more organization at the cooperative 
or association levels.  
 
Colombia is a powerful participant in the coffee world and has strong advantages for 
producing and commercializing coffee in the world. This is especially true in the quality 
rather than the low-cost side of the market. Its institutions and its brand reputation are 
among its most important assets.  However, its ability to respond to an evolving crisis 
has been limited due to its high production costs especially labor costs that are unlikely 
to diminish, the declining price/value ratio of its coffee, and its institutional shortcomings.  
The latter have led to undue political influence, inefficiencies, and a belated strategic 
market orientation.  
 
Any sustainable policy improvement must revolve around revitalized institutions.  These 
must be agile, accountable, and more transparent. While the federation is passing 
through a time of crisis it is nonetheless of the pivotal sectoral institution and will be 
central to the resolution of this crisis.  Its importance at the local levels, its experience 
and achievements, and its dedicated new leadership all indicate that it’s performance 
will be critical for the welfare of the coffee sector well into the future. A set of private-
sector-led and market-responsive policies are necessary to revitalize the position of 
Colombian coffee and stimulate the necessary shifts toward improved competitiveness.  
Such market-oriented development must integrate smallholders and also can have 
significant potential externalities (improved standards, environmentally friendly 
production practices, and so forth) and crossover effects in other rural subsectors.  
 
One of the difficulties in establishing policy is its distinct  impacts on producers of 
different sizes. Although it appears that large producers have a higher proportionate 
output, traditionally smallholders are known to be more viable productive when 
measured in diverse production terms.  The trend towards smaller coffee plots, which 
can be managed by families will likely continue. Directing policy and infrastructure 
investments more toward so-called marginal areas may be justified by growing evidence 
that the marginal returns to investment there are higher on average than in the more 
advantaged areas (Altieri and Uphoff, 1999), provided that the investments are not too 
scattered and sporadic (Hazell and Fan, 2000) and that adequate competitive factors of 
production exist in those areas. Otherwise they would be better  targeted for 
diversification and social safety nets where necessary.  While there's often inherent 
policy discrimination against smallholders that needs to be balanced, the needs of   75
larger producers must also be adequately addressed since these can be not only very 
competitive but they also provide valuable employment opportunities.  Medium-sized 
producers, in general terms, appear to be the least competitive according to the studies 
presented. Some farms and even certain sub-regions may have to exit coffee 
altogether. 
 
Since crisis presents significant social problem, making it obvious that coffee growers 
will be unable to continue financing the social programs necessary to maintain public 
welfare in the coffee growing areas.  As a result the government will have to reevaluate 
its role in coffee and consider the public and private alliances that would best serve the 
coffee sector in the long run. 
 
Any sound policy recommendations must offer alternatives that focus on both improving 
competitiveness and reducing poverty among coffee growers. Policies, as a general 
caveat, should be consistent with the reasonable assumption that world prices will 
remain low for the near or medium term. 
 
12.  Integration With the Process of Rural Development  
 
Smallholders are often marginalized in their attempts to benefit from the growing 
international trade in the products they grow. Integrating smallholders and especially 
coffee producers into global markets for their products implies an integrated process of 
rural development. This involves enhanced information flow and training to assess 
these markets and the tools (i.e. technology, infrastructure, and finance) to access 
these markets. Their ability to organize effectively into associations and cooperatives is 
the key factor for most to be able to take advantage of these benefits.  
 
Building the institutional capacity of these organizations will be critical in order for them 
to properly manage their affairs, democratically represent their constituents, and utilize 
commercial, negotiating, and marketing skills. Government can partner with a number of 
institutions (international and domestic) that can deliver this training at the grass roots 
level. There are obvious crossover benefits of such strategies including rural finance, 
input purchase consolidation, marketing, democratic process, etc). These spillovers 
beyond any one sector and benefit rural areas as a whole. 
 
Coffee has the distinct potential, as Colombia’s leading agricultural sector, to 
demonstrate the methods and workable options available to farmers in other agricultural 
subsectors and in that way facilitate more advanced and remunerative agricultural 
development on other crops. This is particularly true since one of the necessary 
requirements to participate in more developed and more lucrative markets will be 
improved grades and standards. Indeed, it could be a future liability to not instill this 
general mindset in the productive rural sector since standards for many agricultural 
products are fast becoming barriers to market entry for those who are not prepared 
(Giovannucci & Reardon, 1999; Giovannucci, 2000).  Improved grades and standards 
can: 
 
§ Create a market niche or conversely prevent entry 
§ Differentiate products to earn a premium    76
§ Assure the quality and reputation of products or organization   
(certification, seals, brands) 
§ Communicate product characteristics necessary for efficient transactions 
(quantity, authenticity, labeling, standard packing) 
§ Protect safety of consumers (labeling, phytosanitary requirements, 
pesticide standards) 
 
Some of the differentiated markets i.e. organics provide many of the necessary training 
steps in establishing and maintaining international level standards such as field to 
consumer traceability, farm inputs accounting, and residue-free harvests. These skills 
and assets can help all farmers, including coffee growers, to be more competitive and to 
even consider diversification if they wish. 
 
13.  Managing transitions: options for diversification  
 
Maintaining government subsidies for a long period is probably not a viable option. 
Given production costs and opportunities, it appears that small and some large 
producers are deemed to remain most viable while medium producers￿some of them 
absentees￿ will be more likely to leave the business.  Support or incentives to move to 
other alternatives will be costly. Any government diversification plan must look beyond 
coffee growers to other rural production systems as part of a more integrated strategy. 
 
Options to escape from the bourse-based tyranny of commodity production fall under 
two main categories: differentiated production including higher quality as noted above 
and diversification.  
 
A sharp decrease in annual crops
40 (i.e. rice, maize, potatoes, cotton and beans) and 
only modest increases in the hectares sown to permanent crops (i.e. bananas, oil palm, 
sugarcane, fruits but not coffee which declined) is part of a disturbing trend that includes 
increased imports and the switch to livestock which is typically characterized by low 
productivity a nd high environmental costs. This trend also implies that the present 
incentive structure fails to allocate resources efficiently and that low labor- intensity 
farming such as livestock has reduced the opportunities for both farm and non-farm 
employment in rural areas. 
 
Much of the expansion or shift noted above has not included smallholders and occurred 
primarily on larger landholdings suggesting difficulties for smallholders to diversify. 
Heath and Binswanger have noted that favoring extensive, large scale agriculture 
“…continues the disturbing trend of the past fifty years where the use of land and labor 
in Colombia has been driven in highly inefficient directions by a variety of agriculture 
sector, land and rural financial policies and sector programs…”.
41 Although many crops, 
which are exclusively associated with food security and smallholder agriculture, have 
                                                 
40 Politicas y desempeño del Sector Agropecuario. Contraloria General de la Republica 
41 Drawing from Heath, John and Hans Binswanger. Natural Resource Degradation effects of poverty and population 
growth are largely policy-induced: the case of Colombia.. Environment and Development Economics. World Bank. 
Conveyed in personal communication from M. McMahon.   77
remained stable according to FAO data, there has been little diversification into cash 
crops that could help balance the dependence on coffee. 
 
According to the most recent data of the Encuesta Nacional Cafetera, the amount of 
land used for coffee farms has shrunk between 1970 in 1997 while the number of coffee 
farms has increased along with the average area per farm available for other 
agricultural products. Recent estimates (CIA 1999) show that the cultivation of coca was 
at 122,500 hectares, an estimated 20.3% increase over 1998. 
 
In 1997 the total area of coffee growing farms amounted to 3.6 million hectares, of 
which 24% was dedicated to coffee,  5.42% to permanent crops such as sugar cane, 
cacao, plantain and others; 33.94% was dedicated to pasture land, 1.1% to commercial 
forests and 31.79% was uncultivated land. According to a 1988 survey
42 8% of coffee 
growing households’ income depended on the sale of these other crops, while 21% of 
these crops, although having market value, was consumed by the same household 
(Junguito and Pizano 1991).  
 
Although diversification is inherently complex and very location specific it can be used in 
different ways t o improve and sometimes even stabilize farmer incomes (Barghouti, 
Timmer, Siegel 1990 & Barghouti, Garbas, Umali 1992).  A diversification program for 
coffee growing areas must start by addressing particular farmer objectives defined 
according to local necessities (i.e. income diversification, improved food safety, promote 
planting of other more profitable coffee varieties, or any combination). It must then help 
farmers to assess these specific issues: 
 
1.  potential markets for different possible crops 
2.  risk 
3.  barriers to entry (investment costs, infrastructure requirements) 
4.  necessary skills and resources (i.e. information, technical capacity, 
financing) 
5.  environmental and economic advantages for production  
6.  challenges pertaining to commercialization (i.e. logistics, quality, 
quantity) 
 
In the past many diversification initiatives have faced critical and sometimes 
insurmountable bottlenecks in these aspects. Farmer-centered research and extension 
is perhaps even more important for small farmer adoption of appropriate sustainable 
farming methods than the correct macro-policies according to extensive case studies of 
agro-ecological farming in different countries (Altieri and Uphoff, 1999).   
 
Frankly, diversification is not easy, especially from a traditional and popular non-
perishable cash crop like coffee. 
 
                                                 
42 Unpublished survey of production structure of coffee farms. Federacafé, División de Planeación 1988.   78
The issue of how much coffee should be phased out will be determined by growers 
themselves responding to the market's messages and government's incentives. 
Unprofitable producers or inefficient production areas should not be subsidized. 
Furthermore, new niches with premium prices do not necessarily imply the phasing out 
of a part of the current production segments.  Each coffee type (depending on quality, 
origin, organic or not, etc.) would have its own price, and the most appreciated coffees 
would get the highest premiums. It has been estimated that in the medium term it is 
possible to develop from current volumes of ½ million bags to about 1.5 million bags of 
niche market coffees (Micolta, 2002) such as single estate, fair trade, organic.  
Colombia already exports 2.5 million bags of  high-quality “100% Colombian coffee” .   
 
It is difficult to have the farmer assume all risks involved in the new crops. Incentives 
should exist for collaborative farmer-oriented research and analysis, technical and 
marketing assistance and to finance the setting up of production, but not for the 
production itself.  
 
A form of diversification that recognizes that there is a limit to the income earning 
capacity of small plots of land is  non-farm rural enterprise. Many useful services from 
machine repair to accounting to equipment rental can provide valuable services that 
support farm communities and make them more productive while reducing the inherent 
risk associated with farming.  
 
A useful and successful experience in this sort of diversification initiatives are the 
Talleres Rurales in the Valle del Cauca, which grew out of women’s cooperatives in 
several coffee growing areas in that department; these cooperatives manufacture and 
assemble different parts of garments for the national and international clothing industry; 
they are a source of employment and income for women members of coffee growing 
households of the area. The DCC of the NFCG played a very valuable role in this 
development. Recently they have received special support by a Spanish NGO which is 
financing the setting up of a new cooperative. 
 
The Government’s Role in Diversification 
 
Market research: preferably through specialized organizations to help identify markets 
and study supply-demand options for agricultural products in short supply, be it for 
domestic or external markets i.e. Corporación Colombia Internacional (CCI) or Instituto 
Centroamericano de Administracion de Empresas (INCAE) new Centro de Inteligencia 
Sobre Mercados Sostenibles (CIMS) based in Costa Rica.   
 
Technical Assistance:  designing appropriate integrated technical packages for products 
deemed promising (dealing with agronomic, environmental, sanitary problems, and 
quality requirements the farmer may face all in one packet). This can be done by 
international agencies such as IICA, government agencies, such as Instituto 
Colombiano Agropecuario (ICA), or through national and regional universities and linked 
with private sector partnership. This could be carried out through the existing extension 
system or via privatized extension services managed and co-funded by local authorities 
(Uganda model), thus ensuring their active participation.  
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Commercialization and logistics:  identification of bottlenecks (i.e. transport costs) and 
proposals for their solutions in order to drive investment that develop the necessary 
channels and facilities the efficient commercialization of agricultural products. 
 
Credit Support:  subsidized credit might be needed to finance the initial investments 
necessary for setting up different production and some modest scheme to support the 
individual producer’s income temporarily during the unproductive phase; but these 
should be minimized and not unduly distort the necessary market-oriented rationale for 
diversifying. 
 
Community Organizations:  supporting producer as well as trade organizations which 
could take the lead in the above processes and provide necessary linkages to markets. 
 
Existing plantations should be integrated into the new diversification scheme perhaps as 
core farms in outgrower  with  schemes or otherwise with modest support i.e. market 
research and technical assistance but not necessarily transitional income support.  
 
In general, the initiative should feature:  
a) demand orientation 
b) voluntary participation  
c) some risks assumed by producers 
d) free information and technology access to interested producers  
 
Resource allocation, in turn, should be based on:  
a) assessment of regional diversification potential 
b) ensuring that those most in need and with greater  potential would have 
greater access to resources 
c) promoting the local economy and supporting households’ income 
Resources  
 
The present support package (Documento CONPES and Annex 1) which has been 
negotiated between the NFCG and the central government has been defined mainly as 
a coffee support package intended to subsidize price and tree renewal.  As many coffee 
producers will surely migrate to other agricultural activities￿due to the crisis￿ the 
package could be redesigned to include the diversification program above mentioned. 
 
Past Experiences in Diversification 
 
Diversification efforts of the coffee growing areas have been promoted by the NFCG 
since 1963 up until 1999 when CORDICAFE
43, the last of them, was finally closed 
down. Throughout those years the Diversification Program emphasized either coffee 
substitution or coffee growers household income support as its goals, depending on 
what at the time was needed in terms of regulating coffee production. 
                                                 
43 Corporación para la Diversificación Cafetera   80
 
According to a different evaluation of the diversification effort (Leibovich, Gómez and 
Reyes, 1993), the program was mostly a means of income support and was hardly 
effective in encouraging coffee substitution. At the time the stabilization policies of the 
FNC made coffee growing an attractive and secure activity when compared to the 
instability of many alternative crops. Today, those conditions have changed and 
diversification is more relevant than ever. 
 
The main diversification instrument between 1963 and 1991 was credit.  The program, 
with the help of a World Bank loan, financed Col$ 110,687 million (in 1988 $), 40% of 
which were disbursed between 1984-1989. Credit can better induce diversification if it 
takes into account agricultural seasonality. According to Leibovich et al, when 
evaluating this experience they concluded that repayment terms should be set 
according to the cash flow requirements of the crops being financed to make them more 
attractive and repayable. 
 
The key finding of CRECE’s review of diversification initiatives (1997), was that the most 
successful diversification enterprises were those initiated by the farmers themselves, as 
opposed to institutional programs led by entities like the NFCG.  Most institutional 
efforts faced market and commercialization difficulties. One important bottleneck 
identified by them was the typically low educational level of beneficiaries thus limiting 
their capacity to adopt and lead new productive initiatives that were imported. 
 
A broader review of agricultural diversification experiences in Latin America's Pacific 
Rim countries (Tabora 1992) notes that while countries pursued individual approaches 
and had dissimilar outcomes, some common themes and issues emerged:  
 
1)  Technology Development versus Technology  Transfer  – New agricultural 
enterprises need to be tested for adoption, cultural management, post-harvest handling, 
packaging, storage, etc. and may require site-specific technologies and techniques.   
 
2)  Public versus Private Investments  -  Both are needed, but might be targeted 
differently.  Many foreign-owned companies helped expand the production and export of 
non-traditional vegetables, ornamentals, and fruits.  However, it was found that there 
were typically only a few alternatives that were more profitable or enjoyed such 
extensive and accessible markets as the traditional commodities that were to be 
replaced.  Public sector has their roles to provide the organizational support and 
linkages that facilitate and private sector's integration of small farmers and laborers 
 
3)  Infrastructure Development – Substantial crop diversification has often occurred 
near urban areas, ports, and in areas close to major export-farming activities (e.g., 
coffee farms).  It is there that integration with pre-established services and facilities, can 
be more readily tapped without the additional burden of new investment.  While such 
corridors or clusters can be efficient and competitive, there is a high-cost: marginalizing 
more remote rural areas and less commercialized farmers (the case for many coffee 
producers). 
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4)  Insufficient Expertise – Even if the technology is available and appropriate and all 
the facilities and support services in place, there is still a need for human capital for 
managers and laborers in terms of skills mix and entrepreneurial capacity.  The lack of 
training has been a major constraint, and clearly places the less educated small farmers 
at a disadvantage.  
 
5)  Difficulties with the Export Market  – Export marketing is more complex than 
marketing domestically in terms of language, logistics, timeliness, and technical and 
cultural perspectives of doing business.  Where efficient farmer organizations are not 
developed there exists a bias in favor of larger more commercially oriented farmers. 
 
6)  Inadequate Financial Incentives  – New agricultural enterprises often require 
longer development periods, new facilities, and a trial period before becoming viable.  
This requires longer term financing and manageable seasonally-adjusted repayment 
rates.  
 
7)  Sustainability of Diversification Initiatives  - There is a need for sustained 
diversification efforts, not just as short-term responses to crises.  Successful sustained 
efforts have been directed by the private sector, though always fully supported in many 
ways by governments, even as political administrations changed.  Diversification is a 
process not an emergency response.  
 
8)  Attractive Business Climate - New products may special incentives in their early 
stages particularly when it is necessary to attract outside investors. The best incentive 
may be a stable and predictable investment climate that is business friendly. 
 
Diversification’s Profile for the Future 
 
Given that low educational levels can detrimentally affect the adoption of diversified 
production systems, it makes sense to first encourage development of crops with which 
coffee farmers are already familiar (sugar cane, plantain, cacao and others), and which 
in most cases can also supply domestic and local demand. One disadvantage of these 
traditional crops is the low income impact for the farmers. An increasingly popular form 
of diversification, especially among larger landowners is cattle. According to a 
considerable body of work at respected institutions
44, there are environmental and other 
disadvantages to this approach and it should therefore only be considered with great 
caution.  
 
New non traditional crops especially those where greater value can be added by 
farmers should be encouraged where the necessary conditions allow for it. In cases 
such as these, possible beneficiaries should have access to adequate market research, 
appropriate technical assistance, credit and solutions to obstacles in commercialization 
and logistics; also forms of community organizations should be encouraged to emerge 
around the new products so as to give them sustainability through time. 
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There is already a useful body of knowledge that should be utilized. Several possible 
diversification crops and their fixed and variable costs of production and post-harvest, 
and demand possibilities have been studied in the past by the NFCG's Diversification 
Program and CORDICAFE (the entity which replaced the Diversification Program).  In 
the year 2000 Beatriz Marulanda re-evaluated several crops for ‘Plan Colombia’ as part 
of a NFCG proposal for diversification of coffee growing areas. The crops studied were 
Asparagus, Cacao, Rubber, Citrus Crops, and Avocado.  
 
Diversification into Agro forestry shows great potential. According to Ministry of the 
Environment statistics for 1999, Colombian wood consumption amounts to 4-5 million 
cubic meters a year, 70% of which is supplied by natural forests and only 30% by 
commercial plantations. Thus a diversification program encouraging wood production in 
coffee growing areas is bound to decrease coffee dependence. This increasing 
forestation could also help to promote an environmentally friendly system of coffee 
production. 
 
Diversification systems tend to wane in popularity when coffee prices are high but this 
does not mean that they can be disregarded at those times since they have long-term 
requirements and cannot be easily started and stopped. This points out the 
government’s role in maintaining a longer-term perspective and helping stimulate 
increased diversification despite short-term price fluctuations in one or another of the 
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Annex 1.  Colombia’s Coffee Sub-Sector Public Supports 
 
As world coffee prices have continued decreasing, the tax take, both in relative and in 
absolute terms, decreased as well.  In part as a result of this but also due to poor 
management, most of FNC’s accumulated assets￿the bank, the financial corporations, 
and others￿were lost. 
 
This meant that there were no resources left for the implementation of coffee policy.  As 
a result, the Colombian government came to the rescue with an aid package, financed 
from the National Budget. For the first time in history the government began to pay a 
direct subsidy  to coffee growers. The package of subsidies includes support to the 
internal coffee price, stimulating the renewals of coffee trees and refinancing credits. A 
summary follows. 
 
1.  A constant subsidy of COL$30,000
45/carga
46. This means that the growers receive a 
price equivalent to world price plus that subsidy net of processing and transportation 
costs.  The government announced that will maintain the subsidy for three years, 
with the expectation that world prices will sometime recover. The budget to finance 
the subsidy was COL$31,300 mill.  in 2001; and COL$94,800 mill. in 2002 and 2003  
 
2.  A subsidy of COL$12,000 mill. in 2001 and COL$44,100 mill in 2002, to finance 
program to renew coffee trees in 140.000 has.  This program is a follow up to that 
implemented by the NFCG during the last three years, when 210.00 coffee has. 
were renewed with its own resources.  
 
3.  A subsidy of COL$44.000 mill. during 2002 to finance technical assistance.  In the 
past, programs of this nature were financed with own resources. 
 
4.  A refinancing credit program for COL$60,000 mill.  
 
5.  Participation of the NFCG in Plan Colombia.  This amounts to COL$60,000 mill. in 
social and economic investment programs. 
 
6.  COL$7,500 mill. to finance joint research projects between Cenicafé (The research 
center of the NFCG) and other research centers on the exploitation of the 
biodiversity resource in coffee growing regions. 
 
7.  Other complementary programs, on rural education and housing whose main 





                                                 
45 February 2002 Exchange rate: 1US$=COL$2,300 
46 Carga = 125 Kgs. If  the international coffee price goes up higher than US$0.80/lb. parchment, the subsidy 
disappears   88






First and foremost, it should be noted that despite the impressive growth rates for these 
markets, t hey are still relatively small and can only accommodate a limited number of 
new entrants.  With that caveat, their value may be greater for their externalities i.e. 
benefits to the producer such as improved natural resource management, lower risks, 
etc. than for their price premiums.  They can therefore be a valuable part of competitive 
strategy, though not the entire strategy for a country with considerable production 
volume like Colombia.  
 
Coffees from areas that are specifically demarcated and acknowledged as having 
distinct physical characteristics such as microclimate, soil composition, and plant 
varieties have successfully been marketed with their specific Geographic Indications 
of Origin (GIO). Development of such programs, sometimes called appellations, 
creates the mechanisms for permanent structural change built on a new agronomic 
model, similar to the wine industry. Much like the wine industry, this permits a unique 
competitive advantage and, if properly marketed, can result in stronger demand and 
higher prices that may be somewhat more immune to market fluctuations than 
commodity products.  Despite recent setbacks in seeking legal protection for GIO in the 
United States, this differentiation strategy has been successful for many regions, among 
the  most notable being Jamaican Blue Mountain, Hawaiian Kona, and Guatemala 
Antigua whose popularity have spurred reports of global sales far greater than their 
actual production volumes. This implies that such initiatives on the part of producing 
countries will also require investment in monitoring and enforcement.  
 
Specialty coffee, sometimes used interchangeably with “gourmet” coffee although the 
former more commonly refers to a larger set of coffees including flavored, espresso-
based, sustainable coffees (see below), and cold preparations. Gourmet used to refer 
strictly to higher quality coffees sold, often as whole beans, in dedicated coffee stores or 
cafes. Although this term still suggests a degree of exclusivity, such coffees have 
actually penetrated most marketing channels and are available now even through mass 
merchants and supermarkets. Market trends suggest that there is room for such 
expansion given that there is increasing differentiation, especially in price and 
considerable growth in sales and profits. The market expansion for specialty coffees, 
led by high visibility brands like Starbucks, has been significant in the U.S. markets and 
is now spreading back to Europe where the café concept originated and specialty 
coffees have long held a considerable market share.  
 
In the U.S., where coffee imports account for ¼ of global totals, the specialty coffee 
industry accounts for approximately 17% of the total volume yet its $7.8 billion in sales 
represent approximately 40% of the $18.5 billion U.S. coffee market’s total revenue
48 
                                                 
47 Extracted with permission from: How Markets Influence Poverty and the Environment: The Transformative Power 
of Coffee. Daniele Giovannucci, ed. Forthcoming. 
48 SCAA Coffee Market Size 2000. SCAA 1999 Coffee Market Summary. ICO Production Statistics 2000/2001. ICO 
US market estimates do not take into account retail value and volume of coffee beverages in the food service 
segment.   89
and an even greater percentage of its profits. It is the only segment of the coffee 
industry that has shown consistent and notable growth
49. According to the International 
Coffee Organization (ICO) and the SCAA, most potential specialty coffee markets are 




The  sustainable coffees: organic, fair trade and shade grown are predominantly 
produced by small farmers and characterized as paying farmers reasonable prices, 
providing incentives toward organic production and rewarding farmers for practicing 
good natural resource stewardship
51. They tend to promote water conservation and 
protection, energy conservation, recycling,  and even community/cooperative 
development. Until recently their scarce presence in the marketplace caused some 
confusion about what they each actually represent. Now with both clear definitions (see 
below) and international certification standards it is incumbent upon the coffee industry 
and regulatory bodies to help educate consumers and ensure that coffees using these 
labels are indeed certified by an independent third party. Failure to do so will cost the 
industry a valuable means of differentiation and the resulting erosion of consumer 
confidence will render the terms meaningless and therefore remove a valuable tool from 
the repertoire of the small coffee producer who can least afford such a loss.  
 
Organic  coffees incorporate management practices to conserve or enhance soil 
structure, resilience, and fertility by using cultivation practices and only non-synthetic 
nutrients and plant protection methods. Organic certification is also required of the 
processor and roaster in order to be sold as such. Organic coffees have been on the 
market for several decades
52 but broad appeal and volume sales have only occurred 
since the late 1980s. In United States average annual growth rates of approximately 
12% for organic coffee have been strong over the last five years and are expected to 
continue solid growth, albeit less strongly.
53 North American consumption 
(predominantly U.S.) is estimated at approximately 6 million kg but growing with 13% of 
the consumers who are regular drinkers of specialty or gourmet coffee – that’s 8 million 
people -  purchasing organic coffee at least once
54.  The EU consumes even more
55, 
than the U.S. led by Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark
56. Premiums 
paid to the producers average US$.33 per kilo and are often higher based on quality
57.  
 
Fair trade coffee is purchased directly from internationally registered and certified 
cooperatives of small farmers that are guaranteed a minimum and consistent contract 
price as well as access to some credit from the purchaser if necessary. Fair trade 
encourages community driven investment in public goods like education, healthcare, 
and infrastructure.  The Fair trade market sets a minimum price currently US $1.26 for 
                                                 
49 National Coffee Association (NCA) estimates average annual growth of about 30% in last five years. 
50 Specialty Coffee Assn. Estimates (T. Lingle). Annual Coffee Report 1998. 1999 International Coffee 
Organization (ICO). May 2000 ICO updates. 
51 Partly adapted from Conservation Principles for Coffee Production. www.consumerscouncil.org 
52 First recorded certification is Finca Irlanda in Chiapas, Mexico (Demeter biodynamic). 
53 2001 Manufacturers Market Survey.  Organic Trade Association.  Greenfield, MA 
54 U.S. National Coffee Association. 2001 Winter Drinking Survey. 
55 Initial reports from large EU study to measure volume and trends that is currently underway. 
56 EU estimates vary and recent estimates run as high as 13.7 million kg 
57 Based on NY “C” price for arabica, Robusta prices are lower. One European report claims to have found premiums 
of as much as US$1.50 per kilo   90
washed arabica and US. $1.41 if organic. The price benefit is particularly noticeable 
during low price markets. arabica farmers averaged superior prices of US$.64/kg in 
1999 and US$.95/kg in 2000
58. In 2000 14.4 million kg certified Fair Trade coffee was 
imported from 22 producer countries led by (in volume order) Mexico, Peru, Colombia, 
Nicaragua, and Guatemala. Nearly 40% of this coffee is also certified organic. 
Approximately 2.1 million kg went to North America and most of the rest to the EU. 
Netherlands, Germany, UK, and Switzerland are the largest consumers. This category 
has shown steady but erratic growth with the European markets being more mature and 
the U.S. growing dramatically in the last three years posting imports of ca. 3.6 million kg 
in 2001.  
 
Shade or Eco-friendly coffee production systems maintain and enhance wildlife habitat 
and biological diversity particularly through effective management of the forest canopy 
on the farm and protection or restoration of surrounding natural environments. Globally 
more than 3 million kg of Eco-friendly coffee were certified in 2000-2001, the bulk of this 
is in Guatemala and El Salvador. This nascent market has yet to prove itself but has 
already seen success in select markets, mostly in the North America.  Estimates for 
year 2000 sales of certified Shade grown coffee are approximately 1/2 million kg 
although much more was sold uncertified. Premiums paid to producers vary and have 
ranged from US$.04/kg toUS$.22/kg 
 
Although there is certainly room for growth in all of these differentiated markets, as 
competition builds evidence clearly indicates that cup quality will be critical. See Chart 
12. Here, Colombia has a distinct advantage due to its historic focus on quality and the 
mechanisms to foster it.   
 
 




                                                 
58 Difference between average annual market prices and FT contract prices. Robusta figures are lower. Source: FLO   91




US$1 =  2,300  Pesos Colombianos (2001) 
Weights And Measures 
 
1 hectare (ha) = 10,000 m2 = 2.47 acres 
1 quintal (qq) = 100 pounds = 46 kg 
1 metric ton (ton) = 2,205 pounds 
1 bag of coffee = 60 kg = 132.3 lbs Acronyms 
 
 
ACPC       Association of Coffee Producing Countries  
ALMACAFE  Almacenes Generales de Depósito de Café 
S.A.(warehousing) 
CABI   Commonwealth Agriculture Bureau International  
CAIC   Comisión de Ajuste de la Institucionalidad Cafetera    
CENICAFE       Colombian Coffee Investigation (Research) Center 
CIAT        Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical 
CORDICAFE     Corporación para la Diversificación Cafetera  
CRECE      Centro Regional de Estudios Cafeteros y Empresariales 
DANE  Departamento Nacional de Estadísticas (Statistics 
Department) 
DCC        Departamental Coffee Committees 
DNP  Departamento Nacional de Planeación (Planning 
Department) 
FAO        Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
GIO         Geographic Indications of Origin  
GMO        Genetically Modified Organism  
HACCP       Hazards Analysis at Critical Control Points  
ICA         International Coffee Agreement  
ISO         International Standards Organization 
MCC        Municipal Coffee Committees 
MRL        Maximum Residue Levels 
FNC        National Coffee Fund 
NFCG       National Federation of Coffee Growers   93
NYBOT         New York Board of Trade 
RMD         Risk Management Division of the NFCG 
SCAA         Specialty Coffee Association of America  
SMEs         Small and Medium Enterprises  
SPS/TBT        Sanitary and Phytosanitary/Technical Barriers to Trade  
WTO         World Trade Organization  